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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background
No one would dispute that credit card use has become an important part of
household finance.

Credit, in general, allows for transactions over time, making it

possible for consumers to borrow against their future incomes. Credit cards are the
most popular source of consumer credit. Credit cards serve two distinct functions for
consumers: a means of payment and a source of credit (Canner and Luckett, 1992).
Credit cards provide a safe, secure, and convenient alternative to cash and checks,
reducing the cost and the risk of payment, explaining the growing popularity of credit
cards among the elderly (Zywicki, 2000). On the other hand, Consumers resort to credit
cards in order to smooth their consumption when their incomes fluctuate. Hence, credit
cards give their users the flexibility of revolving some or all of their debt.
While credit card usage constitutes a relatively new phenomenon, it became
widespread in 1990s. Not only did more consumers start using credit cards, but also
they started carrying more balances forward and paying both high explicit and implicit
interest charges on their outstanding balances.

Moreover, invoking a credit card

revolving credit option has led to personal financial problems, such as personal
bankruptcies and bad credit histories, making it difficult and expensive for a person to
take a loan later. While borrowing money on a credit card is expensive, approximately
half of credit card holders in the United States regularly carry unpaid debt, incurring
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interest charges and some other fees not only on existing balances, but also on any
new charges made on the card as well.
Even though all of the largest issuers have lowered interest rates on many of their
accounts below the high rates maintained during the 1980s and 1990s, the interest rate
on credit card plans averaged 14.68 percent in 2007 (FRB, 2008). On the other hand,
credit card interest rates are higher than other consumer credit interest rates.
Nevertheless, the holding and use of general-purpose credit cards with a revolving
feature have increased substantially over the last decade. Furthermore, the revolving
credit component of total household debt has increased faster than household
disposable income, making both policy makers and the banking community pays more
attention to the credit card market (Ekici, 2006). Real revolving consumer credit grew
about 1600 percent from 1969 to 1989 (Duca and Whitesell, 1995).
Surprisingly enough, the size of the total consumer revolving and non-revolving
debt rose five times in size from 1980 ($355 billion) to 2001 ($1.7 trillion) to almost $2.6
trillion in 2008 (FRB, 2008).

The total U.S. consumer revolving debt amounted to

$963.5 billion in December 2008 of which 98% was credit card debt (FRB, 2009).
According to the Consumer Finance Monthly (CFM) of The Ohio State University, the
average credit card balances for those carrying a balance rose from $7,362 in 2006 to
$9,336 in 2009 (CFM, 2009).
According to the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances, balances on bank cards
accounted for 87.1 percent of outstanding credit card balances in 2007, up from 84.9
percent in 2004 (FRB, 2009). Approximately 73.0 percent of the U.S. families surveyed
in 2007 had credit cards, compared to 46.0 percent in the early 1990’s (FRB, 2009). On
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the other hand, average and median credit card balances both rose from 2004 to 2007.
The average balance for those carrying a balance rose from around $5,100 in 2004
(2004 dollars) to $7,300 (2007 dollars) in 2007. That is almost a 30.0 percent increase
from 2004’s average balance.

The median balance for those carrying credit card

balances rose to $3,000 in 2007 from $2,200 in 2004, almost a 25.0 percent increase
(FRB, 2009).1 The noticeable difference between median and average debt is due to
some credit card holders carrying very large amounts of debt which skewed the
average.
The latest projections in the credit card industry estimate that there were 159 million
credit cardholders in the United States in 2000, 173 million in 2006, and the number is
projected to grow to 181 million Americans by 2010 (Nilson Report, 2008).

According

to the 2004 Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances statistics, approximately
74.9 percent of the U.S. families surveyed in 2004 had credit cards, and 58 percent of
those families carried a balance (FRB, 2006).
According to 2007 Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances statistics, of the
73.0 percent of the U.S. families surveyed in 2007 who had credit cards, 60 percent had
a balance at the time of the interview (FRB, 2009). These so–called “revolvers” exhibit
payment behavior that differs from those who repay their entire credit card balance
every month.

As of the end of 2007, consumers carried a total of about $951.7 billion

dollars in outstanding balances on all their revolving accounts (FRB, 2008).

_________________________________
¹ The Survey of Consumer Finances is a survey of U.S. household sponsored by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. It is conducted every three years, and the data are collected by the National Research Center at the University of Chicago.
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1.2. Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to use monthly random telephone survey data on the
household level of credit card usage to identify and estimate the underlying
determinants and various factors that influence consumers’ credit card switching
behavior. In the credit card industry, some critical questions remain unanswered about
what influences a consumer decisions whether to switch or not to switch credit card
balances (Ekici, 2006).

Because there are many firms in the credit card market,

competition is supposed to be intense.

However, the industry deviates from being

perfectly competitive, because the industry fails to offer consumers the benefits
resulting from a perfectly competitive market, such as low prices (low interest rates),
teaser rates (sweeteners) for consumers to switch, and other incentives and perks
associated with credit cards.

Consumer-level data consistently show that many

consumers carry balances on their credit cards with fairly high interest rates even
though they receive offers from cards with lower rates (Stango, 2002). An econometric
model and an empirical estimation procedure will be used to predict consumer behavior
in the credit card market and to examine whether consumers switch cards (balances)
when they are offered to do so. Using recent consumer finance data, this research
empirically tests the effects of a variety of variables including some economic,
demographic and attitude variables, such as income, interest rates, outstanding
balances, employment, and other demographic variables significance in influencing
consumer decisions whether to switch or not to switch cards.
consumer switching costs in this industry will be discussed as well.

The existence of
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1.4. Organization of the Dissertation
The organization of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 1 provides background
material for the study, discuses the significance of the study, and outlines the
organization of the discussion. This chapter also provides the purpose of the study.
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature and outlines the theoretical background.
Chapter 3 presents a simple version of Klemperer’s two–period duopoly model of firms’
competition applied to the credit card industry. Chapter 4 describes the data source
along with descriptive statistics. It also describes the econometric methods to be used
and a number of econometric issues. Chapter 5 presents the estimation methodology
and empirical results. Chapter 6 summarizes the key findings, the implications of the
study, and presents some suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Overview of Literature
Despite the fact that the first credit cards were issued approximately 50 years ago,
research into their usage has been relatively new. The bulk of early research on credit
card usage centered on explaining the stickiness of interest rates in the credit card
industry and effects of search on interest rates prevalent in the 1980s. Early research
has attributed the rate stickiness in the credit card industry to the failure of interest rate
competition due to the following three sources: switching and search costs, adverse
selection, and consumer irrationality.
The first attempt to explore this industry was pioneered by Ausubel (1991). Ausubel
noticed that although there were about 4,000 banks in the US credit card market, the
industry was far from being competitive because of high and sticky interest rates during
1980s. He uncovers abnormal returns by firms in this industry. He argues that despite
considerable variation in the underlying cost of funds, credit cards interest rates
remained sticky and high during 1980’s. Ausubel argues that from 1982 to1989, the
cost of funds rate fluctuated between 6-15 percent and then declined from 15 percent to
10 percent at the end of this period. Despite this significant reduction in the cost of
funds, credit card interest rates remained constantly high at almost 18 percent in the
same period. Hence, the credit card industry deviates from being perfectly competitive.
Ausubel attributes the failure of competition in the credit card industry to the following
reasons: switching and search costs, adverse selection, and consumers’ irrationality.
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According to Ausubel’s theory, consumers underestimate their borrowing potential
because they expect to use the cards for convenience, not as a source of credit.
Therefore, they accrue outstanding balances and pay unnecessary high interest rates
on those unanticipated balances.
In his study, Ausubel categorized borrowers into two groups: low–risk borrowers
and high–risk borrowers. Low–risk borrowers underestimate their borrowing potential
and are less sensitive (responsive) to the interest rates because they do not intend to
borrow in the first place but they end up doing so. High–risk borrowers are interest–
responsive and fully intend to borrow. Thus, if a bank unilaterally lowers its interest
rate, it will primarily attract the interest sensitive customers whom a bank does not wish
to attract. Those customers represent high–risk borrowers. Therefore, when a single
bank reduces its credit card rate, it worsens its pool of customers. Ausubel argues that
this behavior is compounded by the presence of high switching and search costs. In the
presence of this adverse selection problem, credit card issuers face a pool of
consumers who differ in their risk degrees. However, good debtors will be overcharged
and bad debtors will pay less than what they should, resulting in driving out good
debtors from the market. Therefore, card issuers would be discouraged from competing
on interest rates. This fear of adverse selection problem encourages card issuers to
keep the card rates high and therefore make extraordinary profits. Ausubel provides an
additional explanation for the industry failure which is consumers’ irrationality.
Consumers borrow on their credit cards without realizing that they will not be able to pay
their balances in full.
Pozdena (1991) provides an alternate market-based explanation for insensitivity of

8
credit card interest rates to changes in the market rates. Pozdena argues that the
majority of credit card holders are convenience users who routinely pay off their
balances in full each month without revolving balances from one billing period to
another. Credit card convenience users do not search for lower rates, but they will be
primarily sensitive to annual fees and grace periods, an implication that is consistent
with Ausubel’s theory. This will dissuade cards issuers from lowering their card rates.
On the other hand, households resort to borrow at high card interest rates when their
financial condition is relatively weak (moral hazard of lending). Because credit card
debt is poorly collateralized and costly to service, bank credit card interest rates are
sticky (sluggish) and are not responsive to changes in other market rates.
Canner and Luckett (1992) employ information theory to explain that consumer
insensitivity to bank card interest rates may be rational if credit cards are used for
transaction convenience, rather than for carrying balances. Convenience users do not
gain much from searching for lower rates. Therefore, they are rationally insensitive to
the interest rate. Hence, credit cards’ convenience and service quality become more
important than the cost of the funds. Canner and Luckett suggest another reason that
consumers might be relatively insensitive to interest rates. Some credit card holders
who carry high levels of balances from one month to month may be willing to switch
their balances to other cards that offer lower rates. High levels of balances make these
consumers less attractive high-risk consumers to issuers offering lower rates, inducing
card issuers to keep their interest rates high. This argument is consistent with Calem
and Mester (1995), discussed below.
Mester (1994) provides different explanations for high and sticky interest rates on
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credit cards by focusing on the non-collateralized features of credit card debt. Mester
recognizes that imperfect information about cardholders’ risk is the reason behind the
high rates in this industry. Because low–risk borrowers who have access to low interest
collateralized loans leave the credit card market, card holders are charged high interest
rates on the average. If a bank unilaterally lowers its interest rate, it will attract less
profitable high–risk borrowers. Mester concludes that credit card rates do not fall one
by one when the cost of funds to banks goes down because the demand for credit
cards, in turn, may be influenced by the level of the real interest rate in the financial
markets.
Calem & Mester (1995) support Ausubel’s theory that the credit card industry
deviates from a perfectly competitive model because consumers do not conform to the
behavioral assumptions of perfect competition, due to the existence of search and
switching costs, and due to the likelihood of facing an adverse selection problem by
firms who reduce their interest rates unilaterally. They find that the level of credit card
debt is greater among consumers who do not search for lower rates. On the other
hand, the authors find that consumers with high balances are discouraged from
searching because of their greater likelihood of rejection. The authors argue that fear of
being denied credit makes the consumers stick to their credit card that has high interest
rate.

However, the authors find no evidence that consumers underestimate their

borrowing potential, which was found by Ausubel’s early research. Calem and Mester
attribute the industry interest rate competition failure to consumers’ lack of search for
lower card rates.

Using data from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to

investigate “whether adverse selection problem arises because borrowers face
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switching and search costs or because they are reluctant to search and switch because
they believe their borrowing will be short–lived,” Calem and Mester find there is a
positive relationship between switching and search costs and high balances.

The

higher is the credit card balances are, the higher is the probability of being denied
credit. This will discourage high-balance consumers from search and any price cut will
attract low-balance consumers who are not profitable to card issuers. Therefore,
consumers with high balances will search and switch less, because of their fear of being
denied credit due to high balances. These consumers will, therefore, stick to their
current high-interest rate credit cards.
These finding are consistent with Sharp (1990), who argues that because of an
information asymmetry problem in the credit card market, if a high quality borrower tries
to switch to a competing (uninformed) bank, he may be pooled with low quality
borrowers, inducing card issuers to charge high interest rates. Therefore, card holders
are reluctant to switch cards when they are offered to do so. These findings confirm
bankers’ arguments that credit card rates are sticky because consumers are not
responsive to rate cuts and do not switch cards when they are offered to do so.
Calem and Mester (1995) provide an additional explanation of why the credit card
industry deviates from being perfectly competitive. They attribute this deviation to their
finding that desired consumers with high balances may face higher switching costs than
less desired consumers who are revolving low balances, inducing an adverse selection
problem in the credit card market. Customers who have a high disutility of search and
are highly indebted have much more difficulty switching cards than those who do not. In
investigating this possibility, they test whether high credit card outstanding debt will be
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correlated with the probability of rejection and they find there is a strong correlation.
They also find that banks were rational in rejecting those with large outstanding
balances. If a bank unilaterally lowers its interest rate, it will attract borrowers that
display a high search effort for interest rates who are revolving low balances and who
yield low profits. Borrowers with high balances who are most desired by a bank would
not be easily transfer balances between banks, because they are granted a lower credit
limit by a bank other than their current bank because of information barriers due to
asymmetric information, because their current bank has private information about their
previous credit history.

The authors suggest that focusing on policies that reduce

switching costs in this industry will improve the credit card market industry performance
and will probably lead to more competitive industry.
Brito and Hartley (1995) provide theoretical explanations for interest rate stickiness
based on the liquidity services offered by credit cards’ asymmetric information and
consumer transaction costs. They provide different explanations for the observed high
level of card interest rates. Their theoretical model predicts that it is rational to borrow
on high credit card interest rates and pay interest on outstanding credit card balances
rather than the transaction costs associated with alternative financing. Their model
predicts that even small costs of arranging for other costs of loans can induce
consumers to borrow on higher interest rates. On the other hand, the authors argue
that “a rational consumer may also pay interest on credit card debt to avoid some of the
costs associated with holding precautionary money balances.” Brito and Hartley (1995)
also show that inflexible (sticky) credit card interest rates can be consistent with a
competitive equilibrium under which a new potential entrant earns zero profits.
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Cargill and Wendel (1996), using data from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finance,
empirically show that income negatively affects the likelihood of borrowing on credit
cards but is positively related to the amount borrowed. They also show that consumers
may rationally avoid search for lower interest rates because small outstanding balances
imply a low return to search. Cargill and Wendel argue that there are more credit card
convenience users than suggested by early research. These credit card users do not
benefit much from searching for lower interest rates; therefore, even modest search
costs could keep the majority of these consumers from searching for lower interest
rates. Cargill and Wendel (1996) findings suggest “that lack of consumer shopping for
interest rates may be an entirely rational household decision.” Cargill and Wendel’s
(1996) study findings are consistent with Canner and Luckett’s (1992) and Pozdena’s
(1991) findings.
Stavins (1996) argues that one would expect banks to drop their interest rates to
attract customers in a competitive market. In the class of perfect competition with
complete information, price equals marginal cost and changes in the marginal costs
must be translated into changes in the price of the product. However, credit-card-issuing
banks do not appear to behave in this way in the credit card industry. The industry
interest rates have been consistently higher than other types of consumer debt
instruments.

In her (1996) study, Stavins finds evidence of the adverse selection

hypothesis that the level of the bank credit card rates rises with revenues generated
from fees and finance charges. On the other hand, Stavins rejects the hypothesis that
the demand for credit-card loans is insensitive to the interest rate and finds that
defaulters have higher interest rate elasticity. Therefore, lowering interest rates may
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attract less creditworthy consumers who are most likely to default on paying back their
debt, dissuading some credit-card-issuing firms from lowering their interest rates.
Park (1997) attributes credit card rate stickiness and high profits in the industry to
their option–value nature. He argues that high credit card rates reflect the value of the
cardholders’ option to borrow when they become riskier. “The option value is partly
offset by the presence of cardholders who choose credit card loans while they are less
risky because of high transaction costs of alternative loans.”
Ausubel (1999) finds evidence of adverse selection in the credit card market. Using
data from large-scale randomized trials in preapproved credit card solicitations, he finds
that respondents to solicitations are substantially worse in terms of credit risk than
nonrespondents. Moreover, he finds that solicitations offering inferior terms yield
customer pools with worse credit risk than solicitations offering superior terms.
Consumers who accept inferior credit card offers tend to have higher delinquency rates.
Ausubel concludes that “inferior offer yields an inferior customer.”
The later research based on 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances unravels a
change in the US credit card market. Most of the recent credit card industry research
shows that the industry became more competitive as credit card issuers switched to
variable interest rates and more firms entered the industry.
Crook (2002) shows that credit card holders with higher balances do not search
less than those with lower balances. Using data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer
Finance, Crook finds that households with poor payment histories do not appear to
search more or less than those with better payment histories. Hence, search theory
based on Ausubel (1991) and Calem and Mester (1995) might be less useful in
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explaining credit card pricing in the more recent period. However, search costs may be
higher for those households who miss payments due to their life styles. Crook’s (2002)
study findings support the search theory implications that minorities search more than
whites, that better educated households search more than the less well educated, and
that search decreases with aging. This major finding by Crook (2002) is not consistent
with early research findings, especially what was obtained by Calem and Mester (1995).
The positive effect of high balances on search activity implies that if a bank unilaterally
lowers its interest rates it would not attract relatively high risk borrowers.
Kerr and Dunn (2002) find that despite their high rejection probability, consumers
with high balances search more for better rates than consumers with low balances.
Kerr and Dunn argue that “high rejection probabilities do not affect search propensities.”
Therefore, high interest rate can not be explained by search costs.

Moreover, the

authors find that credit cardholders are becoming more rational and sensitive to the
interest rate terms of a credit card contract. Kerr and Dunn’s (2002) study findings
demonstrates the important role of the Truth-In-Lending Act of 1988 in lowering the cost
of gathering information by cardholders, leading to the decline in credit card interest
rates in recent years.
Min and Kim (2003) investigate the socioeconomic determinants of consumer credit
card borrowing. Using a two–step estimation procedure to model consumer credit card
borrowing, they find that credit-constrained households who are likely to be denied other
forms of credit have a higher demand for credit card borrowing. Their empirical findings
show that the credit card interest rate is only taken into consideration when borrowers
decide whether to borrow or not to borrow. They find that interest rate has no significant
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effect on the amount of borrowing, only on the borrowing decision, dissuading card
issuers from lowering the credit card interest rates even when the cost of funds drops.
Knittle and Stango (2003) provide a different explanation for interest rate stickiness.
Using data from the credit card market during the1980s to test whether a nonbinding
price ceiling may serve as a focal tacit collusion, they find that state-level ceilings during
the 1980s facilitated tacit collusion by credit card issuers, leading to greater-than normal
interest stability, but that national integration of the market reduced the sustainability of
tacit collusion by the end of 1980s.
Berlin and Mester (2004) find that many models of consumer search, such as
Ausubel (1991) and Calem and Mester (1995), fail to explain recent credit card decline
as well as pricing behavior in credit card markets. Moreover, the authors find that a
drop in consumer switching costs is not a good explanation for the drop in credit card
rates in the 1990s.
Dey and Mummy (2005) use data from the 1998 U.S. Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) to examine the association between borrower quality and the offered
menu of credit card borrowing limits and interest rates. Their empirical findings show
that there is a negative relationship between the credit card limit and the interest rate.
On the other hand, they find that an increase in the credit card interest rate will increase
the default rate of the borrower. Moreover, they find that the difference between actual
borrowing and the offered credit card limit will generate an information asymmetry
problem, making the credit card market tend to be incomplete.
Yang et al. (2007) provide an alternative explanation of the long debated puzzle on
the stickiness of credit card interest rates.

They argue that consumers’ unrealistic
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optimism about their future borrowing estimates will make them less sensitive to the
APR and more sensitive to the annual fee. Because these customers are very
profitable, they are offered credit cards with features such as a high APR and a low fee,
inducing card issuers to keep their interest rates high. On the other hand, the authors
provide empirical support to Ausubel’s view that the rigidity of credit card interest rates
is the product of consumer irrationality, “because they do not intend to borrow on their
credit cards, but find themselves doing so anyway.”
Telyukova and Wright (2008) provide a cost-based explanation of why consumers
maintain credit card debt and pay interest despite the associated high interest rates.
They argue that consumers may carry high-interest credit card debt and pay high
interest while maintaining balances in their low-interest bearing bank accounts to avoid
the expected costs of not holding precautionary balances or transactions balances.

2.2. The Nature of the Credit Card Industry
Credit in general is of two types: collateralized (secured) and non-collateralized
(non–secured). Credit cards are a non–collateralized means of credit with an interestfree grace period. Moreover, credit cards are noninstallment consumer debt or open–
ended credit in which consumers do not have to reapply each time a credit transaction
is made. The amount owed can be repaid monthly in equal or unequal payments
(Garman and Forgue, 2000).
In recent years, the use of credit cards and other forms of credit has increased
tremendously. In particular, credit cards have become a major instrument for financing
purchases in the U.S.
Credit cards are one of many ways through which people borrow money. Users
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make the purchase today using their future incomes. The credit card issuer pays for the
transactions, but the card users have to repay the money plus any interest accrued.
Interest is the cost of borrowing money and is calculated as a fixed fraction of the
total outstanding balances. Because of the uncertainty problem in this industry, the
interest rates on the credit cards are higher than for regular credit.
Credit card issuers use credit bureau consumer reports and other publicly available
information about borrowers’ creditworthiness to evaluate borrower riskiness so that
they can alleviate some of the information asymmetry. However, the unsecured status
of credit card loans makes them riskier than secured consumer loans, and more difficult
to collect if a consumer defaults. The uneconomic nature of collecting loans in case of
credit card loans defaults makes lending on consumer credit card a very risky credit
operation.
Zywicki (2000) argues that the presence of uncertainty in the credit card industry
provides an explanation for the stickiness of credit card interest rates and their
indifference to changes in the cost of funds. First, because of the problem of adverse
selection in the industry, low-risk borrowers can’t signal reliability and credibility to
lenders, because it is easy for high-risk borrowers to signal themselves as low-risk
borrowers. Therefore, it is rational for lenders to charge the highest rates assuming that
all borrowers fall in the high-risk category. Second, the unsecured nature of the credit
card loans sufficiently increases the probability of consumer default with no costfeasible means of loan collection. These costs are assumed not to be affected by
changes in the cost of funds.
Users of credit cards fall into two broad categories: convenience users (liquid) and
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revolvers (illiquid). The convenience users (almost 30 to 40 percent of the entire credit
card users) are those who pay their credit cards balances off every month and thereby
avoid finance charges. They also view their cards simply as a transaction medium to
substitute for cash and checks, and along with transactions, they often receive extra
benefits from various perks programs such as cash back and frequent flier miles.
Interest rates might not mean much to them, but if they see a lower rate on another
card, they might still switch.
Revolvers are those credit card holders who view a credit card as a debt instrument
and a source of credit. They regularly roll over most of their outstanding balances to
future billing periods, incurring interest charges and sometimes other fees in order to do
so. In addition, most revolvers jump from one card to another, taking advantage of the
introductory “teaser” rate but then switching to yet another card when the low-interest
introductory period ends.
“Teaser” rates are much lower than the prevailing interest rate for a limited period of
time, encouraging consumers to transfer balances to the new card offering the lower
interest rate. Apparently, a cardholder who revolves regularly is more credit constrained
than other cardholders and wishes to utilize the credit function as a source of credit as
opposed to other card’s attributes (Carow and Staten, 2002).
Liquid consumers benefit from credit cards because they are granted a grace
period with other enhancements, such as frequent-user awards.

Most credit cards

provide a grace period. If payment is made in full, the consumer does not incur finance
charges. Illiquid consumers benefit from credit cards because they become able to
borrow against their future incomes (Chakravorti and Ted, 1999). Because credit card
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convenience users use credit only for convenience, they are not very profitable to the
credit card issuers. However, the interest-free grace period for convenience users is
financed by the revolvers (Chakravorti and Emmons, 2003).
Economic information theory predicts that revolvers are more likely to be sensitive
to interest rates and credit card solicitations than convenience users. On the other
hand, convenience users are more likely to be sensitive to the amount of the annual fee
and the length of the interest free grace period than revolvers (Canner and Luckett,
1992).
In terms of consumer risk, industry researchers distinguish four types of cards
users: (1) low-risk convenience users who use cards for convenience purpose only with
no intention to revolve balances; (2) low-risk users who revolve balances; (3) high-risk
users who carry balances and (4) high-risk users who do not carry balances (Kim, Dunn
and Mumy, 2005).
Researchers have traditionally tried to examine the underlying determinants of
consumer credit card borrowing despite the availability of other low-cost financing debt
instruments. Among many factors affecting card adoption include a fair interest rate,
cash bonuses, no annual fee, and quality customer services.
Canner and Luckett (1992) argue that credit cards have become an indispensable
source of identification and a convenient means for making reservations in hotels, plane
tickets, and the like. Carow and Staten (2002) find that convenience and rebates are
the primary reasons for using a bank credit card. Brito and Hartley (1995) argue that in
revolving balances, a rational consumer would pay interest on outstanding card
balances to avoid transaction costs associated with arranging other loans, while
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minimizing the costs associated with holding precautionary money (Brito and Hartley,
1995).
Sprenger and Stavins (2008), using data collected in the 2005 Survey of Consumer
Payment Preferences, find that credit card revolvers are significantly more likely to use
debt and less likely to use credit than convenience users who repay their balances each
month. They provide two reasons for the expensive credit card borrowing, the costbased explanation and the behavioral explanation. Under the cost-based explanation,
consumers may view credit card borrowing to be less expensive than other borrowing
alternatives when the take the costs associated with insufficient liquidity and alternative
financing arrangements into consideration. Under the behavioral reasoning, credit card
borrowing may be attractive for those individuals who overvalue present consumption
and undervalue future costs associated with repaying the debt, given the credit card
usage decoupling of separating the pleasure received from consumption from the pain
of paying for it.

2.3. The Evolution of the Credit Card Market
In 1887, in his novel “Looking Backward,” Edward Bellamy, an American author
and socialist, speculated about buying commodities with a card. The introduction of the
credit card in the mid-twentieth century revolutionized and transformed how people live.
Credit, in general, is as old as human society. However, the concept of a generalpurpose credit card came to existence in 1949 when Frank McNamara dined in a New
York restaurant and discovered he could not pay for his meal. Later, he founded and
named Diners Club, which would issue cards to consumers and sign merchants to
accept those cards (Evan and Schmalensee, 1999).
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In 1958, the first widely accepted plastic charge card was introduced by American
Express having the marketing tagline as “Do not Leave Home without It.”
BankAmericard introduced the first revolving general–purpose credit card in 1959,
which became Visa in 1977.

In 1966, the Interbank Card Association introduced

“Master Charge” which became MasterCard in 1979.
To make bank cards appealing to consumers who already had department store
cards, bank card issuers granted those consumers an interest-free “grace period” of 2025 days, the same grace period that was granted by department stores (Canner and
Luckett, 1992).
Visa and MasterCard have been dominating the U.S. general purpose credit card
market. Both issuers combined accounted for an estimated 602 million cards in 2008,
up from an estimated 599.4 million cards in 2007. In addition, American Express and
Discover issued an estimated of 111.1 million cards in 2008, up from an estimated 109
million cards in 2007 (Nilson Report, 2009).
The credit card industry in the United States experienced high and sticky interest
rates in 1980s.

During this period, the average credit card rate was almost 19.8

percent, while the rate for the perfectly competitive market with zero profit was
estimated to be around 13.2 percent (Ausubel, 1991). In his major investigation of the
US credit card industry, Ausubel (1991) attributed the industry deviation from being a
perfectly competitive industry to three reasons: consumer irrationality, search costs, and
switching costs.
Much has changed in the credit card industry. In particular, the Truth-in-Lending
Act of1988 has produced a major shake-up in the industry. The Fair Credit and Charge
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Card Disclosure Act of 1988 intends to improve informational efficiency in order to
increase competition in the credit card industry.

Under the Truth-in-Lending Act,

creditcard issuers are required to disclose all information regarding interest rate, annual
fees,and grace period in their solicitations, thereby forcing card issuers to report upfront their most important contract terms (Kerr and Dunn, 2002). Beginning in the mid1990s, the U.S. credit card market started to become more competitive. Interest rates
became more competitive and variable as price competition increased. There was a
wide dispersion of interest rates, ranging from zero percent introductory rates up to
rates well above 20 percent. Debt-carrying credit card users started to search more for
better rates which enhanced competition in the in the industry (Kerr and Dunn, 2002).
On the other hand, advances in technology in terms of credit security technology and
data quality reduced the economic significance of information–based barriers to
prescreening and solicitation of card applicants. In addition, information innovation such
as widespread access to the internet reduced the search and switching costs of
customers ( Calem, Gordy and Mester, 2005).

2.4. The Nature of Price Competition in the Credit Card Industry
The nature of Price Competition in the Credit Card Industry has been unusual. The
structure of the market is competitive in that the industry comprises of thousands of card
issuers.

Nevertheless, card issuers maintain high credit card interest rates and make

high profits. During the 1970s through the1980s and the early 1990s, the U.S. credit
card market interest rates remained extremely high, hitting their all-time high of an
average of almost 18.0 percent for almost two decades from 1974-1991. Beginning
inthe early-1990s, credit card interest rates started to decline, becoming much more
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responsive to changes in the cost of funds. Thereafter, they fluctuated between 14.0
and 16.0 percent.2 During the early 1990s, Ausubel (1991) noticed that even though
there were many firms in the market, the industry was far from being perfectly
competitive, because of high and sticky industry interest rates. Ausubel also argues
that as a result of this absence of adequate competition, credit card issuers have
earned extraordinary profits, causing them to extend credit to risky consumers. The
credit card issuers attributed the high interest rates to the high default rates.
Stango (2000) investigates pricing and competition in the credit card market. He
shows that the stronger presence of variable-rate firms offering variable-rate cards
wasassociated with more aggressive competition for new customers. He also finds
empirical support of a positive relationship between prices and market share in the
credit card market.
Stango (2002) empirically examines the relationship between pricing for
commercial banks and switching costs. He argues that a given credit card issuer’s price
is an increasing function of the indebtedness of its customers, the indebtedness of its
competitors’ customers, the annual fee charged by an issuer’s competitors, and the
market share of an issuer in its home state. Using data from the Card Industry Directory,
an annual publication that lists data for the largest 250 credit card Issuers over the
period 1984-1994, Stango finds a strong relationship between switching costs of an
issuer’s customers and credit card prices (interest rates).
Chacravarti and Emmons (2003) argue that card issuers, in competing to attract
profitable customers, may offer incentives to convenience users, because some of them
________________
2

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, FRB Annual Report “The Profitability of Credit Card Operations
of Depository Institutions,” June 2001.
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may become revolvers in the future. Gross and Souleles (2002) attribute the increased
competition in the credit card industry to greater consumers’ sensitivity to credit card
interest rates.
The credit card industry is highly concentrated. The top 10 credit card issuers
controlled approximately 88 percent of the market share with $972.73 billion in generalpurpose card debt outstanding in 2008. That includes Visa, MasterCard, American
Express, and Discover and is up from approximately 85% in 2007 (Nilson Report,
2009).

Moreover, the industry has no barriers to entry and exit, consistent with

contestable market theory. The Contestable Market Theory is a theoretical analysis
focusing on perfectly free entry and exit. The theory suggests that the special case of
perfectly free, absolute, reversible entry is the basis for defining efficient allocation.3
The theory rests on the following three assumptions:
1. Entry is free and without limit. With no costs, the new entrant can replace the
incumbent.
2. Entry is absolute. With a slight price difference, the entrant can displace the
existing firm.
3. Entry is perfectly reversible. Firms can exit the market at no cost. Sunk cost is
zero.
The credit card industry is comprised of 6000 atomistic competitors that sell similar
services to millions of customers nationwide. Currently, there are around 10,000
_____________________
3

This section draws on William G. Shepherd, “Contestability versus Competition,” American Economic Review, vol. 74, pp. 572-587,
September 1984. The main sources on contestability are W. J. Baumol, “Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry
structure,” American Economic Review vol. 72, pp. 1-15, March 1982. Baumol et

al. Contestable Markets.
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depository institutions act as agents for credit card issuers, issuing general purpose visa
and MasterCard credit cards to the public and distributing credit cards to consumers. In
addition, two large nonbank firms, American Express Co. and DiscoverFinancial
Services, issue independent general purpose credit cards to the public.
Tables 1 and 2 below illustrate the holdings of credit debt by the type of financial
Institution.
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Table 1: Major Holders of Consumer Total Credit Outstanding Debt (Billions of Dollars)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Year

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total

2219.4

2313.9

2418.3

2551.9

2596.9

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Commercial Banks

704.3

707.0

741.2

804.1

878.5

Finance Companies

492.3

516.5

534.4

584.1

575.8

Credit Unions

215.4

228.6

234.5

235.7

235.0

Federal Government

86.1

89.8

91.7

98.4

111.0

Saving Institutions

91.3

109.1

95.5

90.8

86.3

Nonfinancial Business

58.6

58.8

56.8

55.2

55.6

Pools of Securitized Assets

571.5

604.0

664.2

683.7

654.7

4

Source FRB
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Table 2: Major Holders of Consumer Revolving Credit Outstanding Debt (Billions of
Dollars)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Year

2004

2005

2006

Revolving

823.7

850.0

902.3

2007
969.6

2008
992.3

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Commercial Banks

314.6

311.2

327.3

353.4

390.6

Finance Companies

50.4

66.3

79.9

86.0

74.4

Credit Unions

23.2

24.7

27.4

31.1

33.4

Federal Government

n.a

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Saving Institutions

27.9

40.8

42.5

44.8

39.5

Nonfinancial Business

2.4

11.6

7.8

4.2

4.2

Pools of Securitized Assets

395.2

395.4

417.5

450.0

450.2

4

Source FRB

______________________
4

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, FRB Annual Report “The Profitability of Credit Card
Operations of Depository Institutions,” June 2008.
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2.5. Switching Costs in the Credit Card Market
Switching costs refer to the hidden costs a consumer is faced with when switching
from one producer to another in the marketplace. Switching costs are developed by
companies in order to establish consumers’ lock-in (Klemperer, 1987a).
Switching costs are incurred when consumers switch suppliers; as such ex-ante
homogeneous products become ex-post heterogeneous. The basic theoretical
assumption about switching costs is that once a consumer purchases a product, he is
locked in it.
The vast theoretical literature on switching costs is summarized by Klemperer
(1987a, b, and c). Klemperer (1987a) shows that the existence of switching costs leads
to market segmentation, and reduces the elasticity of demand facing each firm.
Klemperer also shows that non-cooperative equilibrium in an oligopoly model with
switching costs may be the same as the collusive outcome in an otherwise identical
market without switching costs. There are three major types of consumers’ switching
costs:
A) Transaction costs that are associated with changing identical products or
services, such as returning rented equipment to one firm and renting identical
equipment from an alternative supplier.
B) Learning costs that are associated with learning how to use a service or how
new product works, such as learning new computer software.
C) Contractual costs that are present because of special programs, discounts, or
contracts requiring the customer to pay a penalty to switch suppliers, such as
home loan penalty fees required to switch home loan providers.
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The credit card market is a potential market where both search and switching costs
are likely to be present. The basic theoretical assumptions about switching costs can
be applied to the credit card industry. Kim et al. (2003) argue that banking is one of the
major sectors of the economy in which switching costs appear to be prevalent.

In this

market, switching costs (costs of obtaining a new card) would mean that consumers
may view credit cards as functionally identical before they get a card, but might not
immediately switch from their current card to a card with a lower rate (Stango, 2002).
Stango suggests the following three assumptions about switching costs in the credit
card industry:
1. New and existing customers pay different rates on their cards in the credit card
market.
2. Consumers have different values of switching costs (low vs. high switching
costs).
3. Credit card issuers face pools of customers that vary in their degree of lock-in.
There is considerable evidence supporting the existence of the switching costs in
the credit card industry. The pricing structure of the market in which card issuers offer
low introductory rates to new potential customers is consistent with the existence of
switching costs. There are some one-time inconveniences, expenses, and efforts
incurred each time a consumer switches from one card to another. Consumers also
face information costs in searching for the best rates offered by banks on their credit
cards. Some consumers maintain a loyalty toward a product they have been using for a
long time. They may also build up frequent-fliers miles on their cards, have their utility
bills automatically charged, or enjoy the familiarity of having the same account for a long
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time. Because consumers have different motives for holding credit cards, they have
different incentives to incur certain costs of searching for lower interest rate terms (Kim,
Dunn, and Mumy, 2005).
Ausubel (1991) and Stango (2002) argue that some credit card fees, such as the
card annual fee, may prevent consumers from switching cards as it becomes costly for
customers to switch or to carry more than one card. These added costs for switching
may explain why consumers do not switch cards when they are offered to do so, which
contributes to the failure of competition in this industry as theorized by Ausubel (1991).

2.6. The Importance of Consumers’ Switching Costs
Switching costs have far reaching consequences on the working of the credit
market. They increase borrowers’ lock-in and grant the incumbent bank an ex post
monopoly power over its customers. Switching costs may also explain why banks may
prefer to maximize their current market share. Having a large base of borrowers today
will increase future profits given customers’ lock-in. Klemperer (1987a) shows that, in
general, the existence of switching costs lead to market segmentation, and reduces the
elasticity of demand facing each firm.

Even with non-cooperative behavior, the

switching costs lead to an outcome similar to the collusion solution, with the derivative
of price with respect to marginal cost being less than one. When the derivative of price
with respect to marginal cost is less than one, the industry deviates from being perfectly
competitive, especially when some important perfect competition assumptions are
dropped.
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Consumers’ switching costs have important strategic implications for firms who
compete vigorously to build market share before consumers attach themselves to
suppliers. Among those implications are:
1. Switching costs provide a basis for the differentiation of a competing offering in a
given market place for a given period of time.
2. Switching costs influence future consumer behavior, such as increasing loyalty
by making it difficult for the customer to switch.
3. Reducing switching costs for potential customers may make it easier to acquire
new customers. Moreover, switching costs can create a barrier to entry for new
supplying firms (Klemperer, 1987c).
4. Switching costs generally raise prices, discourage new entries, and reduce
market competitiveness (Klemperer, 1995).
Empirical evidence investigating the existence of consumers’ switching costs in the
credit card market is limited. This is because switching costs are intangible costs which
are difficult to measure. There is little empirical literature concerning this issue.
Ausubel (1991) researched the possibility that consumers’ switching costs may
exist in the credit card market, thus explaining the extraordinary profits of card issuers.
He provides some information that shows that switching and search costs may explain
the high interest rates on credit card balances, and he was the first to research the
possibility that consumers’ switching costs may explain the extraordinary profits of card
issuers. However, Ausubel (1991) finds that switching costs are not large enough to
explain the deviation of the industry from being perfectly competitive due to the industry
rate stickiness.
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Canner and Luckett (1992) argue that consumers with high levels of balances have
difficulty switching balances to credit card plans that offer reduced rates. High balances
make these consumers less attractive to card issuers as the probability of their default
increases.
Calem and Mester (1995) show that search and switching costs result in adverse
selection in the credit card market. Specifically, if a bank unilaterally lowers its interest
rate, it will mainly attract cardholders who search most for interest rates. Cardholders
with large balances who yield high profits would be less able to transfer their balances
to a new card issuer due to asymmetric information between card issuers. They also
show that consumers carry balances on their cards with fairly high interest rates,
despite receiving offers from cards with fairly low interest rates. The reason behind
doing so is that consumers with high balances have difficulty switching cards.
According to Calem and Mester there are two explanations for this problem. First,
consumers with high balances are reluctant searchers for better rates as the probability
of being denied credit increases with high outstanding balances. Second, consumers
with high credit card balances would search for the lowest rates to switch cards.
However, these consumers are less likely to be approved credit as card issuers use
consumer debt-to-income ratios to determine whether card applicants will be approved.
Park (1997), using a sample of major credit card issuers, finds that “the low
elasticity of demand for credit card loans implies consumer irrationality and imperfect
information.” Park’s (1997) study findings are consistent with those of Ausubel (1991)
and Calem & Mester (1995).

Park argues that cardholders sluggishly respond to

changes in card rates. Park argues that cardholders with high balances have high
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switching costs, while cardholders with small balances do not care much about credit
card rates.
Stango (2002) adopts the basic assumption of switching costs models to the credit
card market. He shows that switching costs are an important influence on pricing for
commercial banks, suggesting that there is a relationship between default rates and
switching costs, and that credit card issuers’ pricing is positively correlated with some
proxies for switching costs. He empirically examines the relationship between switching
costs and prices, which can be written as a function of the switching costs of an issuer’s
and a competitor’s customers.

Stango also shows that extending credit to risky

students on college campuses, for example, may be profitable because these
customers have high switching costs. Stango also points out that there are consumers
who carry balances on their credit cards with fairly high interest rates, despite receiving
offers for cards with lower rates.
Based on these findings, it seems to be rational for credit card issuers to view high
balances as bad signals. If search and switching costs exist in the credit card industry,
then lowering interest rates will attract consumers with a high probability of default.
The following common facts in the credit card market may be consistent with the
existence of switching and search costs in this industry:
1. Consumers carry balances on their credit cards with fairly high interest rates,
despite receiving offers for cards with lower rates. Of course, there are other
groups of consumers who consistently switch cards, moving from one card to
another to take advantage of the offered teaser rates (Stango, 2002).
2. Banks often offer incentives (teaser rates) to attract convenience users (30-40%
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of the credit card users) who pay their balances in full every billing period because
some of them may become interest–paying credit card users (revolvers)

in the

future (Chakravorti and Emmons, 2003).
3. Consumer–level data consistently show that many consumers carry balances on
their credit cards with fairly high interest rates, indicating that consumers are
becoming more insensitive to interest-rate selection as they feel they will never
get a better rate (Stango, 2002).
4. Banks tend to price discriminate between their pre-existing customers and rivals’
borrowers by offering low introductory rates to the latter (poaching strategies).
Introductory offers take two forms: discounts on new purchases and discount on
balance transfers for a fixed period of time (usually 6-12 months). The interest
rate usually reverts to the cards’ standard variable rate after the introductory
period expires.
5. Consumers with high outstanding balances are reluctant to engage in search for
a lower price, because they are less likely to be approved for a new card.
Chen (1997) argues that card issuers actually pay customers to switch using
introductory teaser rates on purchases and balance transfers which is an indicator of
the presence of switching costs in the credit card market. Competing firms routinely
provide discounts (monetary payments) to new customers for switching from a
competitor(s), and thus charge lower prices to those customers. In standard economic
terms, this is obviously a form of third-degree price discrimination. This is due to banks
being aware of the existence of switching costs, therefore having to tease new
customers by offering low introductory rates. Chen shows that in a two-period
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homogeneous-good duopoly model, the equilibrium amount of discounts offered by card
issuers increases continuously in the expected switching costs of a typical consumer.
Chen also finds that “firms are worse off engaging in the discriminatory pricing, while
consumers need not necessarily benefit from it”. In general, because switching costs
exist, banks will offer low introductory rates to the rival’s customers with respect to the
interest rates charged to their old borrowers (Barone, Felici and Pagnini, 2006).
Recognizing the importance of reducing search and switching costs faced by
cardholders who are willing to switch cards for better rates, credit card issuers have
spent large amounts on advertising to induce consumers to switch cards by reducing
search and switching costs for the consumers they seek (Zywicki, 2000). Marketing
techniques to induce consumers to switch their current credit cards include: offering low
introductory rates on balance transfer and new purchases, issuing gold and platinum
cards with substantial benefits, increasing consumer information about their new
products benefits, and waiving annual fees. The solicitations calls from the card issuers
have increased tremendously in the last two decades. An important consequence of
these solicitations has been the offer of low introductory rates on balance transfers,
encouraging card holders to carry balances from one billing period to another, and
making balance switching a routine matter as it has become much easier for consumers
to search for better rates in the credit card market.
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CHAPTER 3
A THEORETICAL MODEL

3.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to use a simple version of Klemperer’s (1987a) twoperiod model of Bertrand–type price competition applied to the credit card industry in
order to show that in the presence of switching costs (or “brand loyalty”), firms will
charge lower prices in the first period (than they otherwise would) to gain market share
and then charge higher prices in the future.

This will happen if firms have perfect

foresight, and it may lead to either higher or lower equilibrium profits than if firms
behave myopically.
Klemperer (1987a) employs a two-period Bertrand–type price competition model to
show that firms compete aggressively in the early stages of the market development to
gain market share that will be valuable to them in the second period (the mature
market).
Stango (2000) presents a dynamic model of price competition to explain the
emphasis that credit card issuers place on building market shares. Credit card issuers
charge lower rates in the first period and higher rates in the second period utilizing the
market shares they have gained in the first period.
Credit card issuing banks face a trade-off between offering low introductory rates in
the first period (the primary market) to attract consumers and lock them in and charge
high rates in the second period to extract higher profits (rents) from its already locked–in
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customers (Kim et al., 2003). This is the case where credit card issuers are acting with
perfect foresight.

3.2 The Theoretical Model
This model consists of a single industry within a country consisting of two
duopolists selling to domestic consumers. Consider two banks, A and B, producing
functionally identical products, such as credit cards. They are competitively offering
non-collateralized lines of credit in two different markets: a first-period ‘primary market’,
and a second-period ‘mature market’. The primary market is the first level of competition
between banks to capture market share that will be valuable to them in the second
period (the mature market). Because market share is valuable to these banks in the
future, they compete more aggressively than they otherwise would to capture the
highest market share possible. The mature market (the second market) is the second
level of competition where credit card issuers compete for each other’s existing
customers. Firms will choose their strategic variables (ଵ, ଶ) to maximize their total

discounted future profits. For example, they may choose to offer lower prices (interest
rates) in the first period to attract consumers who come to this market seeking credit for
the first time, such as college students.

On the other hand, firms also recognize that

their second-period profits depend on their first-period sales and therefore they have an
incentive to invest in their market shares. Since demand is symmetric between the two
banks, it is sufficient to analyze the behavior of one of the banks as the first main step of
deriving the equilibrium outcome. In the following, I analyze it from the viewpoint of
bank A.
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Bank A’s first-period (primary market) and second-period (mature market) profits
functions under Bertrand competition are

and

p1A(ଵ , ଵ) ൌ (ଵ – C)S1A(ଵ , ଵ) – F
p2A(ଶ , ଶ , ଵ , ଵ) ൌ (ଶ – C)S2A(ଶ ǡ ଶ , S1A(ଵ ǡ ଵ)) – F

(1)

(2)

where the first subscript denotes the period (market) and the second subscript denotes
the firm, and
p1A is bank A’s first-period profits,
p2A is bank A’s second-period profits,
ଵ is bank A’s first-period price (interest rate),
ଵ is bank B’s first-period price (interest rate),

S1A is the demand function for bank A’s credit cards in the first period,
S1B is the demand function for bank B’s credit cards in the first period,
C is the (constant) marginal cost for each bank,

ଶ is bank A’s second-period price (interest rate),

ଶ is bank B’s second-period price (interest rate),
S2A is bank A’s second-period demand function,
S2B is bank B’s second-period demand function,
F is fixed cost.

Bank A’s total discounted profits are given by
pAൌ p1A + λp2A

where λ is a discount factor.

(3)
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The symmetric demand functions for the two firms (duopolists) in the first period as
functions of the prices (ଵ ,ଵ ) are

S1A(ଵ , ଵ) ൌ a – bଵ + γ ଵ

S1B (ଵ , ଵ) ൌ a – bଵ + γଵ

(4)
(5)

where a, b, and γ are the parameters of the demand function. The natural restrictions
are that a > 0, b > 0 and b ≥ γ ≥ 0. Equation (4) states that market demand for bank A’s
product (credit card) is downward sloping in its own price (law of demand) and
increases with increases in its competitor’s price (since the goods are substitutes).
When γ = 0, the products are independent or unrelated and each firm has monopolistic
market power. Whenever γ > 0, the products are substitutes. If γ = b, the total demand
for the two goods is fixed (as seen by adding (4) and (5)). The economic meanings of
the above demand functions parameters are as follows. a is a positive constant (the yaxis intercept). It measures quality in a vertical sense. Other things being equal, an
increase in a increases the marginal utility of consuming the good. b is the slope of the
demand curve. It captures the degree of ‘own price sensitivity’, indicating how quantity
demanded is affected by a change in own price.

γ measures the substitutability

between the products, indicating how quantity demanded is affected by a change in the
cross-price of related goods (bank B’s price).
Each firm competes by setting its price (Bertrand competition) and letting the
market clear.

The oligopolistic structure is one of Bertrand price setters in a

differentiated product market. In period 1, bank A chooses its first-period priceଵ to

maximize its total discounted future profits, taking bank B’s first-period price as given.
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Substituting (4) in (1), bank A’s first-period profit function becomes
p1A ൌ (ଵ – C) (a – bଵ + γଵ) – F

(6)

The second–period demand function faced by bank A’s is assumed to be given by
S2A (ଶ , ଶ , S1A(ଵ , ଵ))ൌ A – bଶ + γଶ + dS1A(ଵ ,ଵ )

ൌ A – bଶ + γଶ + d(a – bଵ + γଵ)

(7)

where A is a positive constant, d is a parameter that measures the extent to which
consumers who previously used bank A's product in the first-period are locked into the
firm’s product in the second period, and where the second equality follows from (4).
Substituting (7) in (2), the second period (the mature market) profits become
p2A ൌ (ଶ – C) (A – bଶ + γଶ + d(a – βଵ + γଵ)) – F

(8)

Assume first that each firm acts myopically and ignores the effect that its firstperiod price has on its second-period profits. Differentiating (6) with respect to P1A, the
first order condition for bank A’s profit maximizing problem is given by
பభఽ
பభఽ

ൌa – 2bଵ + γଵ + Cbൌ 0

(9)

Setting ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ and solving, we have the first–period symmetric equilibrium price
in the myopic case

ߙߚܥ

ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ʹߚെߛ

(10)

Differentiating (8) with respect to ଶ , the first order condition for bank A’s profit
maximization problem in the second period is given by



∂πమఽ

∂మఽ

ൌ  ܣ− ʹߚܲʹ ܣ ߛܲʹ ܤ ߜߙ − ߚܲͳ ߜ ܣ ߜߛܲͳ ܤ  ߚܥൌ Ͳ

(11)
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Settingଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ, and ଶ ൌ  ଶ ൌ ଶ and then solving forଶ, we get the secondperiod symmetric equilibrium price
ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ

ܣߜቀߙെܲͳ൫ߚെߛ൯ቁߚܥ
ʹߚെߛ

(12)

Substituting (10) in (12), we obtain the second-period symmetric equilibrium price in the
myopic case

ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ

൰൫ߚെߛ൯ቇߚܥ
ܣߜቆߙെ൬ߙߚܥ
ʹߚെߛ

ʹߚെߛ

(13)

Consider now a perfect foresight analysis where each firm sets its first-period price,
taking into account not only the effect of doing so on its first-period profitability, but also
the effect on its first-period market share and hence the second-period profitability.
Bank A chooses its prices to maximize its total future discounted profit. If firms care
about the future, then they will compete more fiercely for new customers since these
customers will become valuable repeat-purchasers in the second period. In the twoperiod model of Klemperer (1987a, b) this implies charging lower prices in the first
period than in the absence of this effect. In period 1, bank A chooses its first-period
priceଵ to maximize its total discounted future profits, taking bank B’s first-period price
as given.

Combining (6) and (8), bank A’s total discounted future profits are given by
pA ൌ (ଵ – C) (a – bଵ + γଵ) – F + λ[(ଶ – C) ( (A – b ଶ + γଶ )
+ d (a – bଵ + γଵ) – F]

(14)

Differentiating (14) with respect toଵ , we get
பఽ

பభఽ

ൌ a – 2bଵ + γଵ+ Cb – λଶ dβ + Cdbλ ൌ 0

(15)
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In a symmetric equilibrium where ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ and ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ ଶ
ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ

ߙߚܥ൫ͳߣߜ൯െߣߜߚܲʹ
ʹߚെߛ

(16)

Differentiating (14) with respect toଶ , we get

߲ߨܣ
ൌ λA – 2λbଶ + λγଶ+ λda – λdbଵ + λdγଵ+ λCbൌ 0
߲ܲʹܣ



(17)

and making the same symmetry assumptions stated before (16), we get
ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ

ܣߜߙെߜߚܲͳ ߜߛܲͳߚܥ
ʹߚെߛ

(18)

Rearranging (16) and (18), yields

(2b – γ)ଵ+ (λdb)ଶ  ൌ a + Cb + Cbdλ
(db – dγ)ଵ + (2b – γ)ଶ ൌ A + da + C

(19)
(20)

Using Cramer’s rule, we can solve forଵ and ଶ to derive the non-cooperative pricesetting equilibrium in both periods in the perfect foresight case:
ߙߚܥߚߜߣߣߜߚܥ
ቤ
ܣߜߙߚʹߚܥെߛ
ܲଵ ൌ ʹߚെߛߣߜߚ
ቤ
ቤ
ߜ൫ߚെߛ൯ʹߚെߛ
ቤ

ൌ

ሺఈାఉାఉఋఒሻሺଶఉିఊሻȂሺାఋఈାఉሻሺఒఋఉሻ
ሺଶఉିఊሻሺଶఉିఊሻȂሺఋఉିఋఊሻሺఒఋఉሻ

and

(21)

ʹߚെߛߙߚܥߣߜߚܥ
ቤ
ߜߚെߜߛܣߜߙߚܥ
ܲଶ ൌ
ʹߚെߛߣߜߚ
ቤ
ቤ
ߜ൫ߚെߛ൯ʹߚെߛ
ቤ

ൌ

ሺଶఉିఊሻሺାఋఈାఉሻȂሺఋఉିఋఊሻሺఈାఉାఉఋఒሻ
ሺଶఉିఊሻሺଶఉିఊሻିሺఋఉିఋఊሻሺఒఋఉሻ

(22)
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3.3. Comparisons between the Myopic and Perfect-Foresight Equilibria
3.3.1. The Case C ൌ 0 and δ ൌ 0

From (10) and (13) with δ ൌ 0, it follows that equilibrium prices in the first and

second periods in the myopic case are
ߙߚܥ
ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ʹߚെߛ

ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ

ܣߚܥ
ʹߚെߛ

(23)

(24)

Similarly, from (21) and (22) with δ = 0, it follows that the equilibrium prices in the
perfect foresight case are
ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ

ȽȾ
ʹȾȂɀ

ܣߚܥ
ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ  ଶ ൌ ʹߚെߛ

(25)

(26)

I will consider the following parameter values for numerical example 1.
α ൌ 10, Aൌ 10, λ ൌ 0.7, β ൌ 2, δ ൌ 0, γ ൌ 1, C ൌ 0, Fൌ 0.

(27)

Inserting C ൌ 0 and the other values in (27) into equations (23) and (24), the myopic
prices are

ߙ
ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ
ൌ3.333
ʹߚെߛ

ܣ
ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ ʹߚെߛ ൌ3.333

(28)

(29)

Inserting C ൌ 0 and the other values in (27) in equations (25) and (26), the perfect-

foresight prices are

ߙ
ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ʹߚെߛ  ൌ3.333

ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ

ܣ
ൌ3.333
ʹߚെߛ

(30)

(31)
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We have, from (23) – (26), or from (28) – (31),
Proposition 1: If δ ൌ 0, so there are no switching costs (or “brand loyalty") in the
second period, then the first-period equilibrium price in the myopic case is equal to the

first-period equilibrium price in the perfect foresight case, and the second-period
equilibrium price in the myopic case is equal to the second-period equilibrium price in
the perfect foresight case.

Using equations (6), (8), P1 ൌ P1A ൌ P1B, P2 ൌ P2Aൌ P2B, and (27), the equilibrium

profits of each firm in periods 1 and 2 are

p1ൌ p1A ൌ p1B ൌ ଵ (a – bଵ + γଵ)

(32)

p2 ൌ p2A ൌ p2B ൌ ଶ(A – b ଶ + γଶ)

(33)

pA ൌ pBൌ p1 + λp2

(34)

From (3), (32) and (33), each firm’s present value of profits is

First consider profits in the myopic case. Using equations (27), (28), and (32),
profits in the first period are
p1 ൌ p1Aൌ p1B ൌ ଵ(a – bଵ + γଵ)ൌ 

ߙʹ ߚ

ʹ

ሺʹߚെߛሻ

ൌ 22.221

(35)

Using equations (27), (29), and (33), profits in the second period are
p2 ൌ p2Aൌ p2B ൌ ଶ(A – b ଶ+ γଶ ሻ ൌ

మ ఉ

ሺଶఉିఊሻమ

ൌ22.221

(36)

Using equations (27), (34), (35) and (36), it follows that the total discounted future
profits are:
pAൌ pB ൌ 22.222 + .7(22.221) ൌ 37.775

(37)
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Now consider the perfect foresight case. Using (27), (30), and (32), profits in the
first period are
p1 ൌ p1A ൌ p1B ൌ ଵ(a – bଵ + γଵ) ൌ 

ߙʹ ߚ

ሺʹߚെߛሻ

ʹൌ

22.221

(38)

ൌ 22.221

(39)

Using (27), (31), and (33), profits in the second period are
p2 ൌ p 2Aൌ p2B ൌ ଶ (A – b ଶ + γଶ) ൌ

ʹ

ߚ ܣ

ሺʹߚെߛሻ

ʹ

From (27), (34), (38) and (39), each firm’s present value of profits is
pA ൌ pBൌ 22.221 + .7 (22.221) ൌ 37.775

(40)

We therefore have:

Proposition 2: If δ ൌ 0, so there are no switching costs (or “brand loyalty”) in the

second period, then the profits of each firm (first period, second period, and total) are
the same under myopic behavior as under perfect foresight.>

3.3.2. The Case Cൌ 0 and δ 0

From (10) and (13) with Cൌ 0, it follows that equilibrium prices in the two periods in

the myopic case are
ߙ
ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ

ʹߚെߛ

ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ

ߙ
൰൫ߚെߛ൯ቇ
ܣߜቆߙെ൬ʹߚെߛ

ʹߚെߛ

(41)

(42)

Using (21) and (22) with C ൌ 0, it follows that equilibrium prices in the two periods in

the perfect foresight case are
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ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ
ʹ

ൌ ʹ ൌ ʹ ൌ

ߙ൫ʹߚെߛ൯െߣߜߚ൫ܣߜߙ൯
൫ʹߚെߛ൯൫ʹߚെߛ൯Ȃ൫ߜߚെߜߛ൯൫ߣߜߚ൯

(43)

ʹߚെߛቁቀܣߜቁെߙߜቀߚെߛቁ
ቀʹߚെߛቁቀʹߚെߛቁȂቀߜߚെߜߛቁቀߣߜߚቁ
ቀ

(44)

I will consider the following parameter values for numerical example 2.
αൌ 10, A ൌ10, λ ൌ 0.7, βൌ 2, δ ൌ 0.2, γ ൌ 1, C ൌ 0, F ൌ 0.

(45)

Inserting the values in (45) in equations (41) and (42), prices in the myopic case are
ߙ
ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ʹߚെߛ  ൌ3.333

ଶ ൌ ܲଶ ൌ ܲଶ ൌ

ߙ
൰൫ߚെߛ൯ቇ
ܣߜቆߙെ൬ʹߚെߛ

ʹߚെߛ

(46)

ൌ3.777

(47)

Inserting the values in (45) in equations (43) and (44), prices under perfect foresight
case are
ߙ൫ʹߚെߛ൯Ȃ൫ܣߜߙ൯൫ߣߜߚ൯
ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ൫ʹߚെߛ൯൫ʹߚെߛ൯െ൫ߜߚെߜߛ൯൫ߣߜߚ൯ ൌ2.978

ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ

൫ʹߚെߛ൯൫ܣߜ൯െߙߜ൫ߚെߛ൯

൫ʹߚെߛ൯൫ʹߚെߛ൯Ȃ൫ߜߚെߜߛ൯൫ߣߜߚ൯

Hence we have the following proposition

ൌ3.197

(48)

(49)

Proposition 3: From (46)–(49), it follows that in the presence of switching costs (or
“brand loyalty”), since δ > 0, then firms will charge lower prices in the first period than if
there were no switching costs (or “brand loyalty”), that is δൌ 0. Firms acting myopically
set an equilibrium price in the first period that is independent of how big δ is. Firms
typically set lower prices in the first period in order to capture the market share that will
be valuable to them in the future and charge higher prices in the second period. A firstperiod price cut that increases a firm’s first-period market share (demand) foretells a
second-period price rise.

47
Using equations (6), (8), P1 ൌ P1A ൌ P1B, P2 ൌ P2A ൌ P2B, and (45), the equilibrium

profits of each firm in the first and second periods are
p1 ൌ p1A ൌ p1B ൌ ଵ(a – bଵ+ γଵ)

p2 ൌ p2Aൌ p2B ൌ ଶ(A – bଶ + γଶ)

(50)
(51)

From (3), (50) and (51), each firm’s present value of profits is
pA ൌ pB ൌ p1 + λp2

(52)

First consider profits in the myopic case. Using equations (45), (46), and (50),
profits in the first period are
p1ൌ p1A ൌ p1B ൌ ଵ(a – bଵ+ γଵ)ൌ 22.222

(53)

p2 ൌ p2A ൌ p2B ൌ ଶ(A – bଶ + γଶ) ൌ 28.544

(54)

Using equations (45), (47), and (51), profits in the second period are

Using equations (45), (52), (53) and (54), it follows that the total discounted future
profits under myopic case are
pA ൌ pB ൌ 22.222 + .7(28.544)ൌ 42.200

(55)

Now consider the perfect foresight case. Using (45), (48), and (50), profits in the
first period are
p1ൌ p1A ൌ p1B ൌ ଵ(a – bଵ+ γଵ) ൌ 20.913

(56)

p2ൌ p2A ൌ p2B ൌ ଶ (A – bଶ + γଶ) ൌ 26.239

(57)

Using (45), (48), and (51), profits in the second period are

From (45), (52), (56) and (57), each firm’s present value of profits under perfect
foresight case is
pA ൌ pB ൌ 20.913 + .7(26.239) ൌ 39.727

(58)
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We therefore have:

Proposition 4: From (53) through (58), we see that A’s total discounted profits in the
perfect foresight case is less than the total discounted profits in the myopic case. In the
myopic case, bank A makes more profits in both periods than it makes in the perfect
foresight case. Therefore, in the presence of switching costs, firms will have a degree
of monopoly power over their customers, leading to higher prices and profits in the
future.

3.3.3. The Case γ = 0
From (10) and (13) with γ ൌ 0, it follows that the myopic prices in the first and

second periods are

ͳ
ʹ

ൌ ͳ ൌ ͳ ൌ
ൌ ʹ ൌ ʹ

ఈାఉ
ଶఉ



(59)

ഃഀ

ഃ

ା మ ାఉቀଵିమቁ
ൌ
ଶఉ

(60)

Using (21) and (22) with γൌ 0, we obtain the perfect-foresight prices in the first and
second periods.
ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ
ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ

ʹ

ʹߙʹߚܥߣߜߚܥെߜߣܣെߣߜ ߙ
ʹ

Ͷߚെߣߜ ߚ

ʹ

ʹܣߙߜʹߚܥȂߜߚܥെߣ ߜߚܥ
ʹ

Ͷߚെߣߜ ߚ

(61)

(62)

I will consider the following parameter values for numerical example 3.
α ൌ 10, A ൌ 10, λ ൌ 0.7, δ ൌ 0.2, βൌ 2, γ ൌ 0, C ൌ 0, F ൌ 0.

(63)
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Inserting C ൌ 0 and other values in (63) in equations (59) and (60), prices in the myopic
case are

ߙ
ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ  ʹߚ ൌ2.500

ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ

(64)

ܣߜߙ
ʹ ൌ2.750
ʹߚ

(65)

Inserting C ൌ 0 and other values in (63) in (61) and (62), the perfect-foresight prices in
the first and second periods are

ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ 
ʹ

Hence, we have:

ʹ

ʹߙെߜߣܣെߣߜ ߙ
ʹ

Ͷߚെߣߜ ߚ

ൌ2.306

ൌ ʹ ൌ ʹ ൌ  ʹܣߙߜ
ʹ ൌ2.769
Ͷߚെߣߜ ߚ

(66)

(67)

Proposition 5: Equations (64) through (67) state equilibrium prices under the
assumption of no substitutability, that is γ ൌ 0, so that the demands for the two firms are

unrelated or independent. This means that demand for bank A’s product does not
depend at all on bank B’s product price, so each firm is a monopoly in its market.
Using equations (6), (8), P1 ൌ P1Aൌ P1B, P2ൌ P2A ൌ P2B, and (63), the equilibrium

profits of each firm in periods 1 and 2 are

p1 ൌ p1A ൌ p1B ൌ ଵ(a – bଵ)

(68)

p2ൌ p2A ൌ p2B ൌ ଶ(A - bଶ + d(a – bଵ) )

(69)

pAൌ pB ൌ p1 + λp2

(70)

From equation (3), each firm’s present value of profits is
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Using equations (63), (64), and (68), profits in the myopic case in the first period
are
p1ൌ p1A ൌ p1B ൌ ଵ(a – bଵ) ൌ

ఈ;

ସఉ

ൌ12.500

(71)

Using equations (63), (65), and (69), profits in the myopic case in the second period
are
భ

ሺାమఋఈሻమ

p2 ൌ p2Aൌ p2B ൌ

ൌ 15.125

ସఉ

(72)

Using equations (63), (70), (71) and (72), the myopic total discounted profits are
pAൌ pB ൌ 12.500 + 0.7(15.125)ൌ 23.088

(73)

Using (63), (66), and (68), the perfect-foresight profits are in the first period are
p1ൌ p1Aൌ p1B ൌ 

ʹ

൫ʹןߜߣܣ൯ሺʹߙȂߜߣܣെߣߜ

ʹ ʹ

ߚሺͶെߣߜ ሻ

ߙሻ

 ൌ 12.425

(74)

Using (63), (66), (67), and (69), the perfect-foresight profits are in the second period are
p2 ൌ p2A ൌp2B ൌ 

൫ʹܣߙߜ൯ሺʹߚܣߚߙߜሻ

ʹ

ሺͶߚെߣߜ ߚሻ

ʹ

ൌ15.339

(75)

Using equation (63), (70), (74), and (75), the perfect-foresight total discounted profits
are
pA ൌ pB ൌ 12.425 + 0.7(15.339) ൌ 23.162

(76)

Hence we have the following proposition:

Proposition 6: If firms ignore each other’s pricing behavior, in this case γ ൌ 0, we have
lower prices and profits in both periods in both the myopic case and the perfect foresight

case than if goods were substitutes or related, that is γ > 0. In addition the result tells
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that both firms’ equilibrium profits are lower when goods are independent and products
are totally differentiated in both the first and second periods. Moreover, bank A makes
less first-period profits in the perfect foresight case than it does in the myopic case. On
the other hand, bank A’s second period and total discounted profits are higher in the
perfect foresight case than they are in the myopic case.

3.3.4. Case where C ൌ0 and b ൌγ

From (10) and (13) with b ൌγ and C ൌ 0, it follows that the myopic prices are

ߙ
ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ
ߚ

ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ

ܣߙߜ
ߚ

(77)

(78)

From (21) and (22) with b ൌγ and Cൌ 0, it follows that the perfect-foresight prices are
ଵ ൌ  ଵ ൌ  ଵ

ʹ

ߙȂߣߙߜ െߜߣܣ
ൌ
ߚ

ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ

ܣߙߜ
ߚ

(79)

(80)

I will consider the following parameter values for numerical example 4.
a ൌ 10, A ൌ10, λൌ 0.7, δ ൌ 0.2, β ൌ 2, γ ൌ 2, C ൌ 0, F ൌ 0.

(81)

Inserting the values in (81) in equations (77) and (78), the myopic prices are
ߙ
ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ߚ ൌ 5.000

ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ  ଶ ൌ

ܣߙߜ
ൌ 6.000
ߚ

Inserting the values in (81) in equations (79) and (80), prices in the perfect foresight
case are

(82)

(83)
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ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ ଵ ൌ

ʹ

ߙȂߣߙߜ െߜߣܣ
ൌ 4.160
ߚ

ଶ ൌ ଶ ൌ  ଶ ൌ 

(84)

ܣߙߜ
ൌ 6.000
ߚ

(85)

Therefore, we have the following proposition.

Proposition 7: Given that the total demand for the goods is fixed, that is b ൌγ, then we
have higher prices in both periods in both the myopic case and the perfect foresight
case than in the case where demand for the goods is independent, that is γ ൌ0.
Consider profits. Using equations (6), (8), (81), P1 ൌ P1A ൌ P1B, P2 ൌ P2A ൌ P2B,

and b ൌγ, profits in the first period are

p1 ൌ p1Aൌ p1B ൌ ଵ(a – bଵ+ γଵ) ൌ ଵa

(86)

Using equations (6), (8), (81), P1 ൌ P1A ൌP1B, P2 ൌ P2A ൌ P2B, and b ൌγ, profits in the

second period are

p2 ൌ p2Aൌ p2B ൌ ଶ ሺA – bP2 + γଶ + d(a – bଵ+ γଵ))
ൌ ଶ(A +ߜa)

(87)

Using equation (3), the total discounted profits are
pAൌ pB ൌ p1 + λp2

(88)

Using (77), (81), and (86), profits in the myopic case in the first period are
ߙʹ
p1ൌ p1A ൌ p1B ൌ ଵ a ൌ  ߚ ൌ 50.000

(89)

Using (78),(81), and (87), profits in the myopic case in the second period are
p2ൌ p2A ൌ p2B ൌ ଶ(A +ߜa) ൌ 

ʹ

ሺܣߙߜሻ
ൌ 72.000
ߚ

(90)
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Using (81), (88), (89), and (90), each firm’s total discounted profits under myopic case
are
pA ൌ pBൌ 50.000 + 0.7(72.000) ൌ100.400

(91)

Now consider the perfect-foresight case. Using (81), (84), and (86), profits in the
perfect foresight case in the first period are
p1ൌ p1Aൌ p1Bൌ 

ʹ

ߙʹ െߣߙʹ ߜ െߙߜߣܣ
 ൌ 41.600
ߚ

(92)

Using (81), (85), and (87), profits in the perfect foresight case in the second period
p2 ൌ p2A ൌ p2B ൌ 

ʹ

ሺܣߜߙሻ
ൌ 72.000
ߚ

(93)

Using (81), (88), (92), and (93), each firm’s total discounted profits in the perfect
foresight case are
pA ൌ pB ൌ 41.000 + 0.7(72.000) ൌ 91.400

(94)

Thus we have the following proposition

Proposition 8: In this case, the total demand for the two goods is fixed, that is b ൌγ.
The first period, and total discounted profits are higher in the myopic case than they are

in the perfect foresight case. However, the second-period profits are the same in the
myopic case and the perfect foresight case.

3.4. Conclusions
This chapter shows that there is a relationship between pricing and consumer
switching costs (or “brand loyalty”). Moreover, it suggests that in the presence of
switching costs, firms will charge lower prices in the first period to gain market share
that will be valuable to them in the future and therefore charge higher prices in the

54
future, utilizing the market shares they have gained in the first period. This will give
firms a degree of monopoly power over their existing customers, leading to higher
prices and profits in the future. For example, credit card issuers may choose to offer
lower prices (card interest rates) to risky consumers – students on college campuses –
who may be profitable to them, because these consumers have high switching costs.
This will happen if firms have perfect foresight, and it may lead to either higher or lower
equilibrium profits than if firms behave myopically.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODS

4.1. Data Source and Variables
The unique data set used in this research comes from the Center for Human
Resource Research (CHRR) at The Ohio State University and is known as the
Consumer Finance Monthly (CFM). The Consumer Finance Monthly (CFM) is an ongoing national survey that asks unique questions on credit card usage that are not
available in any major national surveys.
The CFM was instituted in 2005 and has been conducted each month with a
random sample of adult household members.

A minimum of 300 surveys are

completed each month. The random–digit–dialing method of sample selection is used
to select a nationwide sample. By the end of 2009, about 16,000 cases have been
completed and are available for research. Compared with the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF), that takes place once every three years, and sponsored by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the CFM provides more detailed and upto-date data on consumer finances to reflect the most recent changes in consumer
behavior in the credit card industry in terms of credit card usage. The CFM includes a
variety of variables on credit card use, such as balance switching, monthly charges,
revolving balances, annual percentage rate, number of cards maxed out, and monthly
payments.

The CFM also includes detailed questions on credit knowledge, credit

stress, bill payment, demographic information, expectations about the future, household
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debts, savings, and assets. Moreover, besides detailed questions of household credit
card use, the CFM includes a complete series of questions on household assets and
liabilities that allows researchers to analyze consumers’ behavior in relation to credit
cards in the context of their overall financial situations.
The variables used in the analysis can be grouped into three broad categories:
credit card related variables, balance switching variables, and socioeconomic variables.
Annual percentage rate (APR), amount owed on all credit cards, and borrowing limit are
important contractual variables in the credit card section. Balance switching section
variables include whether or not any balances have been switched in the past 6 months,
introductory teaser rates, balance switching fee, number of household credit cards, APR
on the card switched away from, and APR on the card switched to. Socioeconomic
variables can be divided into two subgroups: demographic variables and financial
variables. Demographic variables include age and marital status. Financial variables
include homeownership.
The following are the credit card questions from the CFM that are used in this
paper.
1. Do you have any credit cards? How many credit cards do you have.
2. In the past 6 months, have you switched any balances between cards or to a new
card?
3. What was the old interest rate on the card you switched away from?
4. What was the interest rate on the card you switched to?
5. If you had an unpaid balance on the card you charge the most on, what interest
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rate would you have to pay.
6. Please think about the credit card on which you owe the most. What is the
interest rate for unpaid balances on this card?
7. Are there any attractive reward features on this card?
8. In the past 6 months, what was the lowest credit card interest rate offer you got in
the mail?
9. For all your credit cards taken together, after any payments you have made or will
make on your most recent bills, how much you still owe on them?
10. Is your house/ apartment in which you live is either owned or being bought?
11. Do you currently have Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOCs)?
12. What year you were born?
13. What is your current marital status?
The original sample in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, CFM includes 12,962
households. On average, 75% of the households in the U.S. population have at least
one credit card, and among all cardholders about 40 percent have unpaid balances on
their credit cards. The average balance for those carrying a balance amounted to about
$8,000. In this study, those who have at least one credit card are considered, which will
give us a sample of 1,101 households including only revolvers (those who do not pay in
full each month) of whom 186 cardholders switched cards and 915 did not. Figure 4.1
and Figure 4.2 present detailed statistics on switchers and non-switchers in the sample.
Detailed variables definitions and summary statistics (actual and percentage values) are
provided in Table 4.1. The means and standard deviations in the table are computed
using sample weights so that the descriptive statistics are representative of the U.S
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population. Only households who have at least one credit card are considered in the
calculation of the descriptive statistics.

4.2. Logit Model Specification
The structural method employed in this study resembles models discussed by
Maddala (1992), Pindyck & Rubinfeld (1976), Greene (2003), and Ashenfelter et al.
(2003 pp. 235-240). To examine the consumer decision of whether or not to switch a
credit card (balances), logistic regression analysis is the most appropriate type of
examination. The general formulation of the logit model is given by Greene (2003 pp.
669). The consumer’s switching decision is modeled as
ܻ כൌ ܺᇱ ߚ   ߝ

(4.1)

with

ܻ ൌ ͳ݂ܻ݅ כ Ͳ

ܻ ൌ Ͳ݂ܻ݅ כ Ͳ

The subscript i refers to cardholders. ܻ  אሼͲǡͳሽ denotes the absence or presence of

switching (Yi = 1 if the consumer switches and Yi = 0 if he/she does not switch). In this
formulation, ܺᇱ ߚ is called the index function (Greene 2003 pp. 669), where ܻ כis a latent

(unobserved) variable for credit card switching and the dichotomous variable ܻ is the

observed variable. The vector of covariates ܺᇱ controls for a variety of socioeconomic
variables (financial and demographic) that may correlate with a household’s decision
whether or not to switch a credit card.

These include age, APR, fee, balances,

homeownership, and HELOC. The explanatory variables can themselves be binary or
dummy or quantitative or a mixture thereof. This is because logistic regression makes
no assumptions about the distribution of the independent variables. Table 4.1 presents
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the definitions of all variables used in this analysis. β is a vector of regression
coefficients of the predictor variables and ߝ is the error term, assumed to have a log-

Weibull (double exponential) distribution with a reverse extreme value distribution, that
is asymmetric and has a long tail to the right, with c.d.f: (Greene 2003, pp. 720):
ܨሺɂ ሻ ൌ  ݁ିݔ

షഄ

(4.2)

In this notation ℮ represents the base of natural logarithms which is approximated at
2.718.
When using dummy variables, the dependent variable is not continuous but binary
or dichotomous (a category variable that has two values such as “yes” and “no”). In this
case, the dependent variable takes the two values (1, 0). Positive or (yes) response
would be assigned a value of one, while a negative response would be assigned a
value of zero. Since a positive outcome occurs only when the latent variable exceeds
the threshold, the logit specification of a positive outcome is of the following form
௫ሺ ᇲ ఉሻ


ܾܲݎሾܻ ൌ ͳሿ ൌ
ൌ
ଵା௫ሺ ᇲ ఉሻ


ܻ ൌ ൜

ͳ

ͳ݁ ݔെሺܺ′݅ ߚሻ

(4.3)

ͳ  
Ͳ  

Equation (4.3) represents what is known in statistics as the (cumulative) logistic
probability distribution function. Where Yi is the binary dependent variable indicating
whether or not cardholder i switches a credit card. exp is the exponential function,

sometimes written as e. When cardholder i switches balances, Yi takes the value 1;
otherwise Yi is equal to 0.
If Prob[Y = 1] is the probability of switching a credit card as given by (4.3), then the
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probability of not switching a credit card. It is given by:
ܾܲݎሾܻ ൌ Ͳሿ ൌ ͳ െ ܾܲݎሾܻ ൌ ͳሿ ൌ ͳ െ

௫ሺ′ ఉሻ

ଵା௫ሺ′ ఉሻ

ଵ

ൌ

ଵା௫ሺ′ ఉሻ

(4.4)

The general formulation of the logit model for the general case of (4.3) and (4.4) is
given by Greene (2003 pp. 663-755). The estimation method for the logit model is
maximum likelihood. The maximum likelihood function for a sample of n observations
can be conveniently written as:


ଵି

LሺߚȁData) ൌ ςୀଵൣܨ൫ܺ′ ߚ൯൧ ൣͳ െ ܨ൫ܺ′ ߚ൯൧

(4.5)

for Yi = 0,1. If Yi = 0, we obtain equation (4.3), and if Yi = 1, we obtain equation (4.4).
The log-likelihood function is
ln[L(β| Xi)] ൌ ݈݊ ܮሺ ߚȁܺ ሻ ൌ σୀଵሼ୧ ݈݊ ܨሺܺᇱ ߚሻ  ሺͳ െ ୧ ሻ ݈݊ሾͳ െ ܨሺܺᇱ ߚሻሿሽ
௫ሺ ᇲ ఉሻ


ൌ σୀଵሼYi ln[ଵା௫ሺ
ᇲ ఉሻ] + (1


௫ሺ ᇲ ఉሻ

Yi) ln[1 െ


ൌ σୀଵሼYi ln[ଵା௫ሺ
ᇲ ఉሻ] + (1 Yi) ln[


ൌ σୀଵሼܻ ܺᇱ ߚ െ ݈݊ሺͳ  ݁ݔሺܺᇱ ߚሻሻሽ

௫ሺ′ ఉሻ

ଵା௫ሺ′ ఉሻ

ଵ

ଵା௫ሺ′ ఉሻ

ሿ}

ሿ}

(4.6)

To examine the effect that a particular independent variable (Xn) has on the
probability of switching cards, we need to calculate the marginal effect that an
independent variable (Xn) has on the probability of switching for cardholder i.

The

marginal effect that an independent variable (Xn) has is calculated by taking the partial
derivative of ܾܲݎሺܻ ൌ ͳሻ with respect to (X)n. Hence, in the logit model we can see

that the estimated marginal effect of an independent variable (Xn) on the credit card
switching probability ܾܲݎሾܻ ൌ ͳሿ is given as follows:
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డሺ ୀଵሻ
డ

ൌ

డி൫ᇲ ఉ൯

ൌ 

డ

ߚ

௫ሺᇲ ఉሻ

ଵା௫ሺᇲ ఉሻ

௫ሺ ′ ఉሻ

[1െ ଵା௫ሺ ′ ఉሻሿߚ


ൌ ߚ ሾܲሺܻ ൌ ͳሻ(1Ȃ ܲሺܻ ൌ ͳሻ)]

(4.7)



The derivative in (4.7) is often evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variable and
the marginal effects are calculated for a representative cardholder with sample mean
characteristics (the proportion of cases with the same attribute of interest in the
sample). The result approximates the effect of the covariate near the mean of the
response. On the other hand, it is clear that the effect of (Xn) predictor on the probability
of switching cards is not linear and depends on: the coefficientߚ , the value of the
probability, and the value of the independent variable (Xn). For continuous independent
variables, the marginal effect is the estimated effect on the probability of switching cards
per unit change in the given independent variable. For dummy or category variables, the
marginal effect is the estimated effect on the probability of switching cards when the
dummy variable of interest switches from 0 to 1.

4.3. Methodology: A Simple Consumer Choice Model
Consider the following simple model of consumer choice.

To simplify the

notations, I have avoided using subscripts of i, which could be added to represent
different consumers. There is a time period of length L. During this time period, a
consumer earns income at the rate of M per unit of time. The consumer has a credit
card with interest rate r0, and balances B. At the beginning of the time period of length
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L, the consumer gets an offer of a credit card with interest rate r1, which is less than r0.
Suppose that this interest rate lasts until the end of the period of length L, which is short
enough that we don’t have to consider discounting the future, and that at the end of the
period L, the interest rate the consumer has to pay is r0 again (whether or not the
consumer accepted offer). The consumer has a transactions cost (or switching cost) of
T if and only if he/she accepts the offer. The consumer’s two choices are: do not accept
the offer or accept the offer. The two possible net incomes for the consumer are
ܫ ൌ (M – ݎ B)L

where

ܫଵ ൌ (M – ݎଵB)L – T

(4.8)
(4.9)

ܫ is consumer’s net income if she does not accept the new offer,

ܫଵ is consumer’s net income if she accepts the new offer.
The two corresponding utility levels for the consumer are

where

ܷ ൌ β(M – ݎ B)L + ߝ

ൌ βML – βݎ B L + ߝ

(4.10)

ܷଵ ൌ β((M – ݎଵB)L – T) + ߝଵ

ൌ βML – βݎଵBL – βT + ߝଵ

(4.11)

ܷ is consumer’s utility if she rejects the new offer,

ܷଵ is consumer’s utility if she accepts the new offer,
ߝ is the error term affecting utility in period 0,
ߝଵ is the error term affecting utility in period 1.

The consumer will accept the new offer if and only if ܷଵ > ܷ and will reject it if ܷଵ ≤ ܷ .
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Y ൌ 1 means that the consumer will accept the offer.
Using (4.12) and (4.13), we get

ܲ[ ܾݎY ൌ 1] ൌ ܷܲ[ܾݎଵ > ܷ ]

ൌ ܲ[ܾݎβML – βݎଵBL – βT- βML + βݎ BL + ߝଵ – ߝ ᧺0]
ൌ ܲ–[ܾݎβݎଵBL – βT + βݎ BL + ߝଵ – ߝ ᧺0]

ൌ ܲ[ܾݎ-β(ݎଵ – ݎ )BL – βT+ ߝଵ – ߝ ᧺0]
ൌ ܲߝ[ܾݎଵ – ߝ ᧺β(ݎଵ –ݎ )BL + βT]

(4.12)

The term on the right-hand side of the inequality in the last line of (4.12) is equivalent to
the negative of the term Xiβ’ in (4.3), except that we have not included the subscript i in
(4.8)-(4.12).
Thus we have
ܾܲݎሾܻ ൌ ͳሿ ൌ

ͳ℮

ͳ

(4.13)

ߚሺܮܤͳݎെܮܤͲݎܶሻ

Y = 0 means that the consumer will reject the new offer. Therefore,
ܾܲݎሾܻ ൌ Ͳሿ ൌ ͳ െ ܾܲݎሾܻ ൌ ͳሿ ൌ ͳ െ

ͳ

ߚሺܮܤͳݎെܮܤͲݎܶሻ

ͳ̼

(4.14)

The odds ratio in favor of switching a credit card, that is the ratio of the probability that
cardholder i will switch her credit card to its complement (the probability of not switching
cards) is
ሾୀଵሿ

ଵିሾୀଵሿ

ൌ

భ
ഁሺ
ಳಽష
భ
బ ಳಽశሻ
భశ̼
భ
ଵି
భశ̼ഁሺభ ಳಽషబ ಳಽశሻ

ൌ

ଵ

̼ഁሺభ ಳಽషబ ಳಽశሻ

(4.15)

Taking logarithms and calculating the logit or log-odds, we gain the log of the odds ratio,
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that is called the logistic transformation, or logit for short
ሾ ୀଵሿ


ሻ
Logit (Y) = ln(odds) ൌ ሺଵିሾ
ୀଵሿ

ଵ



ൌ ሺ̼ഁሺభಳಽషబಳಽశሻ ሻ

ൌ െߚሺݎଵ  ܮܤെ ݎ  ܮܤ ܶሻǡ

where ln is the natural log function.

(4.16)

The marginal effect of switching costs on the

probability of switching is calculated by taking the partial derivative of the probability of
switching with respect to T. The estimated marginal effect of switching cost on the
probability of switching is given by
డሾୀଵሿ
డ்

ൌ

ିఉ̼ഁሺభ ಳಽషబ ಳಽశሻ

ሺଵା̼ഁሺభ ಳಽషబ ಳಽశሻ ሻమ

൏Ͳ

(4.17)

Proposition 1: The likelihood of switching cards decreases with increasing switching
costs.
The marginal effect of the old interest rate (the interest rate on the current card) on
the probability of switching is calculated by taking the partial derivative of the probability
with respect to ݎ . The estimated marginal effect of ݎ on the probability of switching is
given by

డሾୀଵሿ
డబ

ൌ

ఉ̼ഁሺభ ಳಽషబಳಽశሻ

ሺଵା̼ഁሺభಳಽషబ ಳಽశሻ ሻమ

Ͳ

(4.18)

Proposition 2: The likelihood of switching cards (balances) increases with an
increasing current interest rate.

The marginal effect of new interest rate (the introductory or teaser rate on the new
card) on the probability of switching is calculated by taking the partial derivative of the
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probability of switching with respect to r1. The estimated marginal effect of the new rate
on the probability of switching is given by
డሾୀଵሿ
డభ

ൌ

ିఉ̼ഁሺభ ಳಽషబಳಽశሻ

ሺଵା̼ഁሺభ ಳಽషబಳಽశሻሻమ

൏Ͳ

(4.19)

Proposition 3: The likelihood of switching cards (balances) decreases with an
increasing new interest rate.
The marginal effect of credit card debt (balances) on the probability of switching is
calculated by taking the partial derivative of the probability of switching with respect to
B. The estimated marginal effect of credit card balances on the probability of switching,
assuming that the interest rate on the credit card that is switched to is less than the
interest rate on the credit card that switched away from is given by
డሾୀଵሿ
డ

ൌ

ିఉሺభ ିబ ା்ሻ̼ഁሺభ ಳಽషబ ಳಽశሻ
ሺଵା̼ഁሺభ ಳಽషబಳಽశሻ ሻమ

Ͳ

(4.20)

Proposition 4: Assuming that r0  r1, then the likelihood of switching cards increases

with increasing credit card outstanding balances.

The marginal effect of the introductory rate duration (length of time) on the
probability of switching is calculated by taking the partial derivative of the probability of
switching with respect to L. The estimated marginal effect of L on the probability of
switching, assuming that r1 < r0, is given by
డሾୀଵሿ
డ

ൌ

ିఉሺభ ିబ ା்ሻ̼ഁሺభ ಳಽషబ ಳಽశሻ
ሺଵା̼ഁሺభ ಳಽషబಳಽశሻ ሻమ

Ͳ

(4.21)
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Proposition 5: The likelihood of switching balances increases with an increasing
introductory rate time period.

4.4. The Econometric Model
4.4.1. Model Specification
Based on consumer choice theory, the individual decision for credit card switching,
CCSi, among cardholders can be specified as:
CCSi = ƒ(Pi,Mi,Gi,Ei)

(4.22)

where Pi is the price of credit as measured by annual percentage rate (APR); Mi is a
vector of socioeconomic (demographic and financial) variables; Gi is a vector of credit
card related variables; and Ei is a vector of dummy variables.
To control for socioeconomic (demographic and financial) individuals’ differences,
the vector of explanatory variables under Mi includes age, marital status, and
homeownership.
Analyzing consumer behavior in the credit card market by tracking changing
consumer switching behavior among consumers who revolve balances (do not pay
balances in full each month) allows us to look at consumer behavior from broader
prospective. Figure 4.3 compares the mean reduction in the new Annual Percentage
rate (APR1) switchers and non-switchers. Figure 4.4 compares the percentage
reduction of the new Annual Percentage Rate (APR1) for switchers and non-switchers.
Figure 4.5 shows that large number of non-switchers received offers with lower rates
than what they already had but they did not switch, because these rates are introductory
and associated with high switching fees. On the other hand, understanding the
determinants of consumer ability to switch balances from cards that have high interest
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rates to the ones with low introductory interest rates will allow us to understand how
consumers maximize their utilities by switching balances.

4.4.2. The Econometric Model
On the basis of the theoretical considerations, the following two regression
equations are run, logit models will be estimated using logistic regression models for
estimating the probability of a cardholder’s credit card (balances) switching:
Model 1:
ܻଵ כൌ Ⱦ  Ⱦଵ ሺ  ሻ୧  Ⱦଶ ሺଵ ሻ୧  Ⱦଷ ሺ ሻ୧  Ⱦସ ሺሻ୧  Ⱦହ ሺሻሻ୧  Ⱦ ሺ ሻ୧
and

Ⱦ ሺሻ୧  Ⱦ଼ ሺ ሻ୧  ࣟ୧

(4.23)

Model 2:
ܻଶ כൌ Ⱦ  Ⱦଵ ሺ ሻ୧  Ⱦଶ ሺሻ୧ Ⱦଷ ሺ ሻ୧  Ⱦସ ሺሻ୧  Ⱦହ ሺ ሻ୧  ࣟ୧

(4.24)

whereYi = 1 if a consumer switches and Yi = 0 if the consumer does not switch. β1, β2,
β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, and β8 are unknown parameters to be estimated. Finally, ɂ୧ is the error

term.

Switching benefits in equation (4.24) is obtained according to the following

formula: (r0 – r1)BL for each observation in the sample. where r0 is the old interest rate (
APR0), r1 is the new offer interest rate (APR1), B is the outstanding balances, and L is
the duration of the new offer introductory rate (APR1). Maximum likelihood estimation is
used to estimate the above proposed econometric models. The logit model is based on
the cumulative logistic probability of switching as explained by the explanatory variables
included in the proposed econometric models and defined in Table 4.1 below. Table
4.1 presents the definitions of all explanatory variables used in this study. Means and
standard deviations for the financial, socioeconic and demographic variables used in
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this study for the total sample are presented in table 4.2 below. Table 4.3 compares the
sample characteristics of switchers and non-switchers.
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Variables

Type

Yi

Binary

Definition of Variables

1 – If switched
0 – Otherwise

APR05

Continuous

Interest rate on card switched from

APR1

Continuous

Interest rate on card switched to

Intro Rate Period

Continuous

Number of months APR1 is an introductory rate

Balance

Continuous

Balances of all credit cards

NCC

Continuous

Number of household credit cards

Age

Continuous

Age of respondent

Marital Status

Binary

1 – If married
0 – Otherwise

Home Ownership

Binary

1 – If owns a home
0 – Otherwise

Benefits of Switching

Continuous

Amount Saved By Switching according to the formula:
[(APR0 - APR1) × Balance × Intro Rate Period]

Table 4.1: Definition of Variables
5

Note: APR0 and APR1 for those who did not switch was determined by the interest rate on the card on which they
owe the most and the lowest rate the consumer was offered through the mail.

70
Variables

Sample Mean

Sample Standard Deviation

Yi

0.17

0.26

APR0

12.75

6.23

APR1

3.67

5.57

Intro Rate Period

9.03

9.62

7606.13

10775.92

NCC

3.40

2.28

Age

48.55

15.60

Marital Status

0.68

0.49

HomeOwnership

0.83

Balance

0.41

Switching Benefits ($)6

604.37

1348.09

Table 4.2: General Sample Characterstics (N = 1,101)
6

Note: Amount Saved By Switching according to the formula: [(APR 0 - APR1) ×Balance×Intro Rate Period]
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Sample mean

Sample Standard Deviation
Non-

Variables

Non-Switchers

Switchers

Switchers
Switchers

(n=915)

(n=186)

(n=186)
(n=915)

yi

0.00

1.00

0.00

0.00

APR0

12.14

15.75

7.32

6.77

APR1

3.88

2.65

5.31

4.27

Intro Rate Period

9.50

6.76

9.43

10.20

6,535.84

12,871.24

9,420.75

14,779.49

NCC

3.23

4.23

2.24

2.60

Age

48.76

47.51

12.31

11.88

Marital Status

0.67

0.68

0.46

0.47

Home Ownership

0.82

0.90

0.39

0.30

434.75

1438.81

1125.20

1925.76

Balance

Benefits of Switching
(in Dollars Saved)

Table 4.3: Sample Characterstics of Switchers and Non-Switchers (N = 1,101)

72

1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

915

874

460

449

Switchers
Non-Switchers

186

105

107

62

Figure 4.1: Comparisons between Switchers’ Data and Non-Switchers’ Data
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Figure: 4.5: Comparison between Non-Switchers with Lower Rates in the Mail and Non-Switchers with Higher Rates in the Mail
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CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

5.1. Model 1 Determinants of Credit Card Switching
Table 5.1 presents the results of the model 1 (equation 4.23) logit estimation for
credit card switching. Besides the parameters coefficients and standard errors, marginal
effects around the mean are also reported to reflect the estimated changes in the
probability of switching.

The marginal effects are calculated for a representative

household with sample mean characteristics. These regression results support the
general conclusion that consumers’ balances switching is systematically related to the
explanatory variables.

Moreover, they show variables that seem to explain what

influences consumer behavior toward switching.

Among these variables are: old

interest rate, new interest rate, duration of the introductory rate, balances, number of
credit cards (NCC), homeownership, and age. At the conventional 5 percent standard
level for statistical significance, the following coefficients have significance: old interest
rate, new interest rate, duration of the introductory rate, balances, number of credit
cards, homeownership, and age.
One of the key variables of the study, interest rate, is a significant determinant of
credit-card switching. When shopping for credit cards in the market, revolvers usually
prefer offers with lower interest rates, although convenience users are not as sensitive
to the interest rate as revolvers (Canner and Luckette, 1992).
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Not surprisingly, the old interest rate is positively and significantly related to the
likelihood of switching and the marginal effect is about 1.03 percent points with every
one unit increase in the old interest rate..
In recent years, card issuers have made widespread of “teaser” rates, soliciting
cardholders to switch banks.

These teaser rates are simply much lower than the

prevailing rate for the first year or so, encouraging cardholders to switch balances to the
lower interest rates.

After the introductory rate offer period ends, card issuers will

increase the rate to prime plus a dozen. The new interest rate is negatively and
significantly associated with the likelihood of switching because the interest rate is the
price of borrowing and it is more expensive to borrow on credit cards with higher interest
rates.

Holding other variables constant at sample mean levels, one unit increase in

the new interest rate (APR1) will decrease the likelihood of switching by 0.97 percentage
points for a representative household. Hence, my empirical results support and the
following theoretical predictions:
chapter 4).

பሺଢ଼ୀଵሻ
ப୰బ

 Ͳ

பሺଢ଼ୀଵሻ
ப୰భ

൏ Ͳ (see propositions 2 and 3 in

Curiously enough, this empirical finding is inconsistent with Ausubel’s

(1991) finding that cardholders act myopically and do not foresee indebtedness and
interest payments on their outstanding balances.
The duration of new introductory offer rates is positively related to the likelihood of
switching and the marginal effect is 0.23 percentage points with each additional one
month (period) increase in the duration of a new introductory rate offer the
representative household is offered, which means that I have empirical support for the
following prediction:

பሺଢ଼ୀଵሻ
ப

 Ͳ(see proposition 5 in chapter 4).
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Multiple credit cards increase the available funds for borrowing and therefore the
likelihood of switching.

Holding multiple credit cards by a consumer may be an

indication of this consumer’s willingness to take on a high debt which may be
manifested in higher balances held. The logit model shows that number of credit cards
is significantly and positively related to the likelihood of switching and the marginal
effect is 0.94 percentage points with one additional credit card the representative
household has. Switchers tend to hold more credit cards because they can save money
by transferring balances from credit cards with higher interest rates to those with lower
interest rates. This makes sense because the more credit cards a consumer has the
more freedom he/she has to switch balances between existing cards, consistent with
Cargill and Wendel’s (1996) finding that people obtain more cards to allow for larger
balances.
Compared with transactors, revolvers tend to have more credit cards as well as
more balances. Therefore, revolvers have more incentives to search for lower rates.
This is consistent with Cook’s (2002) finding that that credit card holders with high
balances do not seem to search less than those with lower balances.

Moreover,

economic theory indicates that credit card balances should fall as the APR increases.
However, Min and Kim (2003) found that for households, interest rates had no
significant effect on the amount of borrowing, only on the borrowing decision.

The

empirical regression results obtained in this study fit the theory fairly well. The higher
the balances of a representative household, the higher the probability of switching.
Hence, credit card balances have the expected positive and significant effect on the
likelihood of switching.

For a household with sample mean characteristics, each
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additional $100 increase in balances will increase the probability of switching by
0.04473 percentage points. Thus, I have empirical support for the following prediction:
డሺୀଵሻ
డ

 Ͳ (see proposition 4 in chapter 4).

Among demographic variables, age is significantly and negatively associated with

the decision of switching and with each additional year of age the probability of
switching cards goes down by 0.19 percentage points. The negative coefficient on age
is consistent with Calem and Mester’s (1995) and Min and Kim’s (2003) findings that
credit card balances are negatively related to age. They argue that older households
are less likely to use credit cards for borrowing than younger households and the more
elderly an applicant is, the greater the physical difficulty of searching for lower interest
rates is. Also, some elderly consumers may prefer the traditional payment methods to
credit cards, consistent with the premise that age reflects on the amount of desired
credit, borrowing needs tend to be relatively lower in the earlier and late stages of the
lificycle.

Hence, older households search and switch less than younger households.

Homeownership is significantly and positively associated with the decision of
switching a credit card, the estimated difference in the probability of credit card
switching is 9.79 percentage points for a homeowner representative household.
Homeownership may influence credit card borrowing through home equity lines of credit
(HELOC).7 HELOCs provide another finance instrument for consumers who are
homeowners tend to borrow less on their credit cards than renters. They have the
option of borrowing from HELOCS instead from credit card, and they also can choose to
_______________________
7

Home Equity Line of Credit
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pay down their credit card debt using HELOCs. Since renters do not have such an
option, this might be the reason why they switch balances and borrow more on their
credit cards than homeowners.
Marital status (MS) was not found to be significantly associated with the decision of
switching balances. The probability of switching a credit card is less for married
consumers. According to the marginal effect the probability of switching cards for a
married household is 3.44 percentage points less than for non-married household.

5.2. Testing Whether or not Model 1 β1 and β2 Are Equal or Equal to the Opposite
Table 5.2 presents the analysis of testing the hypotheses whether or not the
coefficients on the old interest rates and the new interest rates are equal in magnitude
but opposite in sign. I failed to reject the hypothesis that β1 = – β2, that is β1 and β2 (the
coefficients on APR1 and APR2) are opposite in sign.

However, I rejected the

hypothesis that β1 = β2, that is β1 and β2 (the coefficients on APR1 and APR2) are equal
in magnitude and have the same sign.

5.3. Model 2 Determinants of Credit Card Switching
Table 5.3 presents the results of the model 2 (equation 4.24) logit estimation for
credit-card switching. Besides the parameters coefficients and standard errors, marginal
effects around the mean are also reported to reflect the estimated changes in the
probability of switching. At the conventional 5 percent level for statistical significance,
the following coefficients have significance: benefit from switching, number of credit
cards (NCC) held, age, and homeownership.

As expected, the switching benefit

variable has the greatest influence on why consumers switch credit cards.
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Switching benefit is positively and significantly related to the likelihood of switching.
Holding other variables constant at sample mean levels, each additional unit increase in
switching benefits will increase the likelihood of switching by 0.0060 percentage points
for a representative household. At sample mean levels, a typical cardholder’s expected
benefits from switching is $604.37 over the entire introductory rate period.
The number of credit cards in logit model 2 shows that the number of credit cards is
significantly and positively related to the likelihood of switching in logit model 2 and the
marginal effect is 1.13 percentage points with one additional credit card the
representative household has.
Age is significantly and negatively related to the decision of switching and with each
additional year of age the probability of switching cards goes down by 0.18 percentage
points. Homeownership is significantly and positively associated with the decision of
switching a credit card, the estimated difference in the probability of credit card
switching is 8.96 percentage points for a homeowner representative household.
Marital status (MS) was not found to be significantly associated with the decision of
switching balances. The probability of switching a credit card is less for married
consumers. According to the marginal effect the probability of switching cards for a
married household is 3.18 percentage points less than for non-married household.
5.4. Measuring the Goodness of Fit of the Logit regression Model
The logit regression output yields many new statistics because the estimation
methodology is different from multiple regression.

The first statistic is measure of the

overall fit. The log-likelihood test, analgous to the global F-test where the null
hypothesis says that some of the βs are equal to zero. The absolute values: (880.480)
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and (907.678) in models 1 and 2 respectively have no interpretation; the statistics
shows that model 1 with the eight explanatory variables is significantly better than the
the model with the (base or null) that lacks these variables. Similarly, the statistics
shows that model 2 with the four explanatory variables is significantly better than the
the model with the (base or null) that lacks these variables.
Another way to test the goodness of fit of a logit regression model is to use Hosmer
and Lemeshow test. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test is a measure of overall model fit,
comparing the observed and predicted values. Hosmer and Lemeshow, also called the
chi-square test, has an insignificant Chi-square value for the presented model, yielding
a p-value of 0.0865 and 13.824 Chi-Square value for model 1 (equation 4.23) thus
suggesting a model with a (fairly) good predictive value and indicating a good model fit.
Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between
observed and model predicted values, implying that the model’s estimates fit the data at
an acceptable level.

5.5. J-Tests for Model Selection Results
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 report the empirical results of the J-Tests for models 1 and 2.
Among many approaches which have been formulated for model selection is the J-test
of Davidson and MacKinnon (1981). J-test is most commonly used to test non-nested
hypotheses. This test is used in this paper and is proceeded as follows: (1) models 1
and 2 were estimated, deriving the fitted values (expected values for models 1and 2) of
Ŷi1 andŶi2; (2) the variable Ŷi1 was added as an independent variable to model 2 and the
new model was re-estimated to test the hypothesis that the coefficient on Ŷi1 is equal to
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zero using a t-test. I failed to reject the hypothesis in question; and (3) the variable Ŷi2
was added to model 1 and the new model was re-estimated to test the hypothesis that
the coefficient on ŶI2 is equal to zero. The hypothesis was not rejected. Both models 1
and 2 are accepted models. I failed to reject the hypotheses that the coefficients on the
fitted values of Ŷi2 and Ŷi1 are equal to zero. Adding the fitted values for Ŷi1 to model 2
had no explanatory power over and above the variables in model 2. Similarly, adding
the fitted value of Ŷi2 to model 1 had no additional explanation over and above the
variables in model 1. Therefore, neither model is rejected and both models are
accepted.

5.6. Why Do Not Consumers Switch Their Credit Cards?
The credit card industry is an industry where both search and switching costs are
likely to be present. Switching costs are incurred by buyers for terminating transaction
relationships and initiating a new relation.

Calem and Mester (1995) show that

consumers carry balances on their cards with fairly high interest rates, despite receiving
offers from cards with fairly low interest rates. They argue that the reason behind doing
so is that consumers with high balances have difficulty switching cards. They also
argue that search and switching costs result in adverse selection in the credit card
market. Specifically, if a bank unilaterally lowers its interest rate, it will mainly attract
cardholders who search switch most for lower interest rates. Cardholders with large
balances who yield high profits would be less able to transfer their balances to a new
card issuer due to asymmetric information between card issuers in the credit card
market.

This difficulty in switching balances by those cardholders who carry high
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balances may be an indicator of switching and search costs existence in the credit card
industry.
Stango (2002) argues that consumers are becoming more insensitive to Interest
rate selection because they feel they will never get a better rate. Consumer level data
shows that consumers receive offers with teaser rates to switch credit cards, move
balances from one card to another. However, they are reluctant to do so. One reason
could be the existence of switching costs in the credit card markets. Because these
costs are intangible, they are hard to observe and measure. My empirical data shows
that 95 percent (915 cardholders) of those who did not switch balances received offers
with significantly lower rates than what they already had but refused to switch (see
Figures 4.1 and 4.2).

The reason for this consumer reluctance to switch is that these

offers were introductory offer rates, lasting for very short periods of time.

For

economists, this apparent reluctance to switch credit card balances appears to be
irrational behavior. However, in the credit market, switching a credit card is not always
costless.

Consumers are aware that they are likely to incur certain costs when

switching suppliers. Some of these costs might have to do with switching costs (costs
of switching a supplier). The major switching cost is the transaction cost. There are
some one-time inconveniences and efforts incurred each time a consumer switches
from one card to another. Consumers also face information costs of searching for and
switching to a new credit card supplier and setting up a new relationship, which may be
a time-consuming process. There are also artificial or contractual costs that are present
because of special programs and discounts credit card issuing firms offer their
cardholders. Specifically, consumers may build up frequent-fliers miles on their cards,
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have their utility bills automatically charged, or enjoy the familiarity of having the same
account for a long time. Because consumers have different motives for holding credit
cards, they have different incentives to incur certain costs of searching for lower interest
rate terms (Kim, Dunn, and Mumy, 2005).

It is not unusual for some consumers to

maintain a loyalty toward a product they have been using for a long time. Brand loyalty
increases consumers’ commitment toward a product, making consumer willingness to
switch weaker.
Ausubel (1991) and Stango (2002) argue that some credit card fees, such as the
card annual fee, may prevent consumers from switching cards as it becomes costly for
customers to switch or to carry more than one card. Consumers’ ignorance and
underestimation of their borrowing potentials, leading them to accumulate huge
amounts of debt, may also contribute to their inability to find better rates and so to
switch cards. These added costs for switching may explain why consumers do not
switch cards when they are offered to do so, which contributes to the failure of
competition in this industry as theorized by Ausubel (1991).
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Variables

Coefficient

Standard Error

Marginal Effect

Intercept**

-3.0440

0.4895

N/A

APR0***

8.4147

0.0127

1.0339

APR1***

-7.9180

0.0204

-0.9729

Intro Time Period***

0.0193

0.00844

0.2375

0.000036

7.24E-6

0.0004473

NCC**

0.0769

0.0355

0.9453

Age**

-0.0158

0.00736

-0.1937

Marital Status

-0.2803

0.1894

-3.4447

Home Ownership***

0.7973

0.2792

9.7964

Balance***

Table 5.1: Model 1 Logit Estimates for Credit Card Switching (N = 1101)
Note: Marginal effects are in terms of percentage points
***Significant at 1% level of better;
**Significant at 5% level or better;
*Significant at 10% level or better.
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The Logistic Procedure
Linear Hypotheses Testing Results

Label

Wald Chi-Square

DF

Pr > Chi-Square

Test 1

0.0570

1

0.8113

Test 2

36.8752

1

< .0001

Table 5.2: Testing Whether or not the Coefficients on APR1 and APR2 are Equal
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Variables

Coefficient

Standard Error

Marginal Effect

Intercept**

-2.2077

0.4314

N/A

0.000483

0.000070

0.006089

NCC***

0.0903

0.0339

1.1378

Age**

-0.0145

0.00723

-0.1821

Marital Status

-0.2525

0.1856

-3.1818

Home Ownership***

0.7115

0.2771

8.9667

Benefits of Switching***

Table 5.3: Model 2 Logit Estimates for Credit Card Switching (N = 1101)
Note: Marginal effects are in terms of percentage points
***Significant at 1% level of better;
**Significant at 5% level or better;
*Significant at 10% level or better.
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Variables

Coefficient

Standard Error

Pr > Chisq

Intercept**

-3.1001

0.4933

< .0001

APR0***

8.8474

1.3329

< .0001

APR1***

-8.1569

2.0596

< .0001

Intro Time Period***

0.0193

0.00852

<.0001

0.000041

8.296E-6

< .0001

NCC**

0.0828

0.0358

0.0207

Age**

-0.0167

0.00742

0.0247

Marital Status

-0.2978

0.1900

0.1171

Home Ownership**

0.8144

0.2799

0.0036

Ŷi2_Expected

-0.5341

0.4918

0.2774

Balance***

Table 5.4.: Model 1 (J-Test) Logit Estimates for Credit Card Switching (N = 1101)
Note: Marginal effects are in terms of percentage points
***Significant at 1% level of better;
**Significant at 5% level or better;
*Significant at 10% level or better.

89

Variables

Coefficient

Standard Error

Pr > Chisq

Intercept**

-2.0388

0.4292

< .0001

Benefits of Switching***

0.00563

0.000929

< .0001

NCC***

0.0982

0.0350

0.0051

Age**

-0.0155

0.00727

0.0337

Marital Status

-0.2948

0.1872

0.1153

Home Ownership**

0.7338

0.2719

0.0070

Ŷi1_Expected

-0.7180

0.5041

0.1544

Table 5.5: Model 2 (J-Test) Logit Estimates for Credit Card Switching (N = 1101)
Note: Marginal effects are in terms of percentage points
***Significant at 1% level of better;
**Significant at 5% level or better;
*Significant at 10% level or better.

90
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND SUMMARY

This chapter provides a summary of the main issues, key findings of the study, and
discusses the links between the research and the key findings in this analysis. It also
provides the implications of the study and presents some suggestions for future
research.
The introduction of the credit card in the mid-twentieth century revolutionized and
transformed how people live. According to the CFM, the percentage of credit card
ownership averaged 75% of the population over the last 5 years. With the increase in
credit card borrowing and competition among credit card issuers, the consumer
behavior in this market is becoming more complex. This research is an attempt to
model the changing behavior of credit card switching among consumers who revolve
balances.
The unique CFM data used in this study provides the most up-to-date information
on the consumers’ recent behavioral changes in the credit card industry that is not
available in any other public consumer finance data set. Based on a set of new survey
data, this dissertation empirically investigates consumer behavior in the credit card
industry.
Analyzing consumer behavior in the credit card market helps to provide an
understanding of how consumers maximize utilities by switching balances, and allows
us to look at consumer behavior in the credit card market from broader prospective.
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I have theoretically identified the crucial factors that determine whether or not a
consumer is likely to switch cards. Specifically, this research represents an effort of
modeling credit card switching of consumers using an econometric model that is
anchored on the economic theory of consumer behavior that incorporates demographic,
economic and socioeconomic considerations into the decision making process. It has
empirically investigated consumer credit card usage and switching. The variables which
I have examined have captured some key behaviors which have not been studied
previously and hopefully shed new light on overall consumer behavior in the credit card
market. Using data from the Consumer Finance Monthly (CFM) of The Ohio State
University, I find that at the conventional 5 percent level of significance, the following
variables have significance:

old interest rate, new interest rate, duration of the

introductory rate, balances, number of credit cards, homeownership, and age.

As

expected, interest rates, balance, the duration of new introductory rate, and
homeownership have the greatest influence on why or why not people switch credit
cards in model 1(equation 4.23).

Switching benefit, number of credit cards, and

homeownership have the greatest influence on why or why not people switch credit
cards in model 2 (equation 4.24).
Another key result is that the interest rates on existing balances significantly and
positively influence credit-card switching of the U.S. households. This finding is
consistent with the view that consumers make rational decisions in the credit card
market, since balance-carrying consumers are sensitive to the terms of credit card
contracts, such as the interest rate on existing balances, the new rate, and the duration
of the new rate. It also implies that switching and search costs are important economic
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factors in this market, challenging Ausubel’s (1991) argument of credit card consumer
irrationality and Calem and Mester’s (1995) empirical finding that credit card rates are
sticky because consumers are irresponsive to rate cuts. I have also found that the
longer the duration of the introductory rate, the higher the probability of switching.
The empirical data used in this study tends to support that consumers usually
receive new offers to switch cards with significantly lower rate than what they already
have, however they reject to switch. One of the main reasons for this consumer
irresponsiveness or reluctance to switch credit-card balances is that these offers are
introductory, lasting for only a short period of time. Due to costs associated with the
consumer decision of switching credit card suppliers, consumers may become reluctant
to switch, suggesting that switching costs outweigh switching benefits.
I have indicated earlier in this paper (in chapter 4) that switching a credit card is not
always costless. Consumers are aware that they are likely to incur certain costs when
switching suppliers. Some of these costs might have to do with switching costs (costs
of switching a supplier). There are some one-time inconveniences and efforts incurred
each time a consumer switches from one card to another.

Switching credit card

balances may be a time-consuming process. There are also artificial or contractual
costs that are present because of special programs or discounts offered by credit
issuers. However, due to a lack of information of relevant variables such as switching
fees and annual fees, these variables were not incorporated in the presented models.
However, this does not diminish the results of my research.
Research in the economic literature on credit card markets is relatively new. This
dissertation adds to this young literature, but there is much more to be explored and
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learned. For example, the payment behavior of consumers in the credit card market
could be analyzed and explored. Some consumers use their credit cards as extension
to liquidity and roll over balances, incurring unnecessary costs even though they are not
liquidity constrained. Some may choose to pay exactly the minimum required payment
and some pay more than the minimum, and others pay balances in full. It will be very
useful to model these behaviors.
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The introduction of the credit card in the mid-twentieth century revolutionized and
transformed how people live. Based on a set of new survey data, this dissertation
empirically investigates and analyzes consumers’ behavior in the credit card market.
Specifically, it investigates the underlying determinants of consumers’ choices regarding
switching credit-card balances. To estimate the likelihood that consumers switch credit
cards, two logit models are estimated. Using data from the Consumer Finance Monthly
(CFM) of The Ohio State University, the author finds that at the conventional 5 percent
level of significance, the following variables have significance: old interest rate, new
interest rate, duration of the introductory rate, balances, number of credit cards,
homeownership, and age. As expected, interest rates, balances, the duration of new
introductory offer rates, and homeownership have the greatest influence on why or why
not people switch credit cards. The findings are consistent with the view that consumers
make rational decisions in the credit card market, since balance-carrying consumers are
sensitive to the terms of credit card contracts, such as the interest rate on existing
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balances, the new rate, and the duration of the new rate. It also implies that switching
costs are important, challenging Ausubel’s argument of credit card consumer
irrationality and Calem and Mester’s empirical finding that credit card rates are sticky
because consumers are unresponsive to rate cuts.
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